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This report examines the post-devolution differences in housing 
policy in the four countries of the UK, and the impact these have 
had on low-income households.
Since the 1999 devolution settlements there have been significant 
developments and divergences in housing policies across the UK. 
This report sets out the evidence on the impact this has had on 
housing issues for lower income households. This includes:
•  the priority of housing within devolved budgets;
•  the supply of social housing;
•  reforms to right-to-buy;
•  homelessness and the allocation of housing; and
•  the quality of social and private housing.
by Steve Wilcox and 
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Chapter 1: The 1999 devolution 
settlement
•  Devolution is constitutionally different for the 
four countries. Wales does not have the power 
to make primary legislation. Devolution in 
Northern Ireland was effectively in suspension 
for much of the decade.
•  While housing is devolved, key related 
functions remain subject to UK control: 
mortgage market regulation, housing benefit 
etc.
•  Overall budgets are set by HM Treasury. 
Council housing finances are dealt with 
by ‘concordats’ that reflect pre-devolution 
differences. Over the decade devolved budgets 
grew more slowly than the total UK budget.
•  Per capita spending is higher in Northern 
Ireland, Scotland and Wales than England. 
However spending also varies between the 
regions of England and there is no consensual 
measure of relative ‘needs’.
•  Housing spend (as a proportion of total 
attributable spend) is lowest in Wales. It is 
considerably higher in both Scotland and 
Northern Ireland.
Chapter 2: Economic and social 
trends
•  Home owner affordability worsened in all four 
countries over the decade, but especially in 
Northern Ireland, where it was more acute than 
in England towards the end of the decade. 
Affordability remained less acute in Scotland 
throughout.
Executive summary
•  Unemployment declined over the decade; and 
claimant unemployment rates converged below 
3 per cent in 2008.
•  Earnings grew ahead of inflation in all four 
countries, but most slowly in Wales, which had 
the lowest earnings by the end of the decade.
•  The highest proportion of the UK’s low-income 
population (based on the lowest quintile) 
reside in Northern Ireland. An above average 
proportion also reside in Wales.
•  Just over a half of the low-income population 
in Scotland reside in social housing; just over 
two fifths in England, and just over a third in 
Northern Ireland and Wales, where a higher 
proportion are owner occupiers.
•  Income polarisation within the social rented 
sector increased in Scotland and Wales over 
the decade; but slightly eased in England.
Chapter 3: Promoting supply, 
access and affordability
•  Overall housing supply lagged behind 
household formation in England, Northern 
Ireland and Wales over the decade; but kept 
pace in Scotland.
•  Crude household dwelling balances were 
lowest in England at the end of the decade, 
and considerably lower than in Northern Ireland 
and Scotland.
•  The supply of social sector dwellings fell 
in all four countries, with right to buy sales 
outstripping new stock. The fall was greatest 
in Northern Ireland and Scotland, but at the 
end of the decade social sector dwellings 8 Executive summary
still comprised a quarter of the total stock in 
Scotland; far higher than in the other three 
countries.
•  The rate of new social sector completions 
increased in England and Scotland over the 
decade, but fell slightly in Northern Ireland and 
Wales.
•  Average right to buy discounts were reduced 
to under 2 per cent in England, Northern 
Ireland and Wales by 2007 as a result of 
national, regional and local caps on maximum 
discounts. Average discounts remained 
over 0 per cent in Scotland, as the 2002 
modernised right to buy for new tenants had 
not by 2007 had any significant impact, and 
the original Scottish right to buy never included 
powers to set a maximum cash limit on 
discounts.
•  The policies in England, Northern Ireland 
and Wales have been more effective both in 
reducing stock losses through the right to 
buy, and in reducing discounts to levels that 
represent reasonable value to the public sector 
(given that they are sales to sitting tenants with 
the right to occupy at substantially sub-market 
rents and not vacant possession sales).
•  Looking forward, the discount structure of 
the Scottish modernised right to buy strikes a 
better balance in supporting the objective of 
promoting choice and the option of ownership 
for tenants, without imposing any net costs 
in terms of public sector value for money. 
However, the uncapped ‘old’ right to buy in 
Scotland still results in higher levels of stock 
losses, and considerable net public sector 
costs.
•  Council rents in England increased in line with 
earnings over the decade. In proportional 
terms they increased a little more slowly in the 
other three countries. However, because of 
slower earnings growth they increased as a 
proportion of earnings in Wales.
•  Housing association rents in England, Scotland 
and Wales all rose a little less than earnings 
over the decade. However, they rose sharply in 
Northern Ireland, to levels some £20 per week 
above Northern Ireland Housing Executive 
levels.
Chapter 4: Addressing 
homelessness
•  There has been an intense period of policy 
activity on homelessness since devolution 
– particularly in Scotland and England.
•  The legislative framework has now diverged 
significantly across the UK, with Scotland 
having a far more extensive statutory safety net 
than elsewhere, enabled by the (diminishing) 
relative advantage it enjoys with respect to 
social housing supply.
•  Homelessness prevention activity has had a 
major (and controversial) impact in England 
and Wales, much less so in Scotland and 
Northern Ireland.
•  Levels of statutory homelessness rose in all 
four UK countries in the period after devolution, 
but have declined sharply in England and 
Wales since the introduction of the prevention 
agenda.
•  A large and growing proportion of social 
housing lets are allocated to statutorily 
homeless households in Scotland and 
Northern Ireland, but the proportion of local 
authority lets allocated to this group has 
recently declined in England and Wales.
•  There is an emphasis in all four countries on 
increased use of the private rented sector to 
discharge the homelessness duty, but this has 
had a limited impact thus far (though use of the 
private rented sector as a preventative tool has 
progressed further, especially in England).
•  There are major concerns in all four UK 
countries about levels and distribution of 
Supporting People funding.9 Executive summary
•  The ideal homelessness system would 
combine the vigour of the English and Welsh 
preventative measures with the strong statutory 
safety net available in Scotland.
Chapter 5: Improving housing 
quality
•  The proportion of social housing owned by 
housing associations rose in all four countries 
over the decade; as a result of both new build 
and stock transfers. Nearly a half of the social 
housing stock in England, just over two fifths 
in Scotland, and some 30 per cent in Wales 
were owned by associations by 2007; but 
only a fifth in Northern Ireland, reflecting the 
unique position of the Northern Ireland Housing 
Executive.
•  Stock transfers accessed additional funds for 
stock improvements, as well as changing the 
structure of the social sector housing market: 
24 per cent of the English council stock was 
transferred in the decade; 19 per cent in 
Scotland and 14 per cent in Wales.
•  In Scotland the Glasgow transfer was of 
particular significance, although its failure, 
to date, to complete the anticipated second 
round transfers to small community-based 
associations means it has not yet led to 
the market restructuring that was one of its 
objectives.
•  Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland have not 
followed England in adopting the Arms Length 
Management Organisation (ALMO) model for 
council housing; primarily as it did not offer 
the financial advantages of stock transfer. 
While Scotland more forcefully promoted stock 
transfers following devolution, that stance 
has since softened, partly as a result of the 
Edinburgh no vote, and partly in response to 
the prudential borrowing regime, which has 
increased the financial freedoms of councils 
in Scotland to a much greater degree than in 
England and Wales.
•  While Wales did not initially promote stock 
transfers as strongly as Scotland, it has 
maintained the pressures through limiting the 
budgets for council housing, and from a slow 
start there is now a momentum behind a wave 
of transfers. Three of the Welsh transfers have 
also followed a distinctive route by adopting a 
Community Housing Mutual model, or similar, 
rather than a conventional housing association.
•  The regulatory frameworks for local authorities 
and housing associations have been radically 
recast in England, Scotland and Wales. 
However, these changes are relatively recent 
and it is too early to judge their impact.
•  All four countries introduced new housing 
quality standards over the decade. While 
Northern Ireland adopted the ‘decent homes’ 
standard along with England, Scotland and 
Wales introduced their own quality standards, 
and in both cases these are (in different ways) 
rather higher than the decent homes standard. 
While England set targets to improve both 
social and private sector housing towards the 
decent homes standard, in Scotland and Wales 
their quality standards have only been used to 
set targets for social sector housing.
•  Investment in improving the council sector 
housing stock increased most rapidly in 
England over the decade and (measured 
per dwelling) was far higher at the end of 
the decade than the equivalent spend in 
Northern Ireland and Wales, with Scotland in 
an intermediate position. Substantial additional 
funding for stock improvements were also 
raised through stock transfers.
•  Investment in improving private sector housing 
was a much lower priority in all four countries. 
Grants expenditure (per private sector 
dwelling) was by far the lowest in England; with 
expenditure in Scotland and Wales at double 
the English level, and with four times the level 
of expenditure in Northern Ireland.
•  The proportion of dwellings failing the decent 
homes standard fell in both England and 
(more rapidly) in Northern Ireland; as did the 10 Executive summary
proportion of dwellings failing the Scottish 
Housing Quality Standard. Time series data 
on the Welsh Housing Quality Standard is not 
yet available. Despite the limited government 
support, the private sector stock was improved 
more rapidly than the social sector stock in 
both England and Scotland over the decade.
•  Only in Scotland do the majority of low-income 
households live in social rented dwellings. 
In all four countries low-income households 
are more likely than other households to live 
in dwellings falling below the national quality 
standard (in both private and social sector 
housing). Moreover, private housing is more 
likely to fail those standards than social 
sector housing, and the majority of low-
income households living in below-standard 
accommodation live in private housing.
•  In that context the question arises as to the 
continuing appropriateness of the policies and 
priorities that focus far more on improving the 
social sector than private sector dwellings.
•  In all four countries average energy efficiency 
ratings for social sector dwellings are higher 
than for private sector dwellings. Scotland has 
the highest ratings; and the average rating for 
private dwellings in Scotland is higher than for 
social sector dwellings in England and Wales.
•  Policies to improve the energy efficiency of 
dwellings have also prioritised support to 
improve social sector dwellings in all four 
countries, with limited means tested help 
available to assist with improvements in 
the private sector. These schemes are also 
constrained by the links with pension credit 
and council tax benefit, which have low take-
up rates.
•  With mounting concerns about carbon dioxide 
emissions in the future, all four countries 
will need to consider measures that are 
more effective in delivering energy efficiency 
improvements in the private sector.
•  Housing management standards for social 
sector housing have improved in all four 
countries over the last decade, although they 
are still lagging somewhat among Scottish 
and Welsh local authorities. It is difficult, 
however, to link the improvements to the 
specific arrangements to monitor standards 
and regulate social landlords in each country, 
although in England there is a suggestion that 
the incentives for high performing ALMOs 
resulted in rather greater improvements 





This report is one of a series commissioned by 
the Joseph Rowntree Foundation to evaluate the 
impact of the 1999 devolution settlement on low-
income households.
The focus of the report is specifically on the 
impact of devolution on the housing circumstances 
and prospects of low-income households, and 
that focus provides both a discipline and constraint 
on the scope and content of the report.
The report is concerned primarily with the 
impact of devolved housing policy making on 
low-income households; and the focus is on the 
measurable outcomes for those households, rather 
than the wider debates and developments in the 
devolved housing policy arenas. Some of the key 
documents outlining those policy developments 
are listed in Box 1.
While it is timely to review the operation of the 
impact of the 1999 devolution settlement as a 
decade has now passed, at the same time it must 
be recognised that it takes time for new housing 
strategies and policies to be developed, and even 
longer for them to begin to have any measurable 
impact. There is also an inevitable time lag in the 
generation of both survey and administrative data.
It follows that in almost all cases the report 
is in practice examining the impact of the 
implementation of devolved policies over a rather 
shorter period than a decade, and that there 
is inevitably very limited evidence in respect of 
the impact of more recent policy developments 
introduced towards the end of the devolution 
decade.
Nonetheless it is already clear that the 
devolution of housing policy has made a difference 
in the housing circumstances and prospects of 
low-income households in the four countries of the 
United Kingdom (UK), and that the potential for 
devolution to make a difference will increase further 
in the years ahead.
Chapter 1 sets the scene by outlining the terms 
of the 1999 devolution settlement, and the different 
ways in operates in the four countries. This 
includes a discussion of the financial arrangements 
for the budgets of the devolved administrations, 
and in particular the arrangements related to 
housing finance.
Chapter 2 summarises the wider economic, 
social and housing market trends impacting 
across the UK over the devolution decade, and 
the differences and changes in incidence of low 
incomes in the four countries.
Chapter 3 examines the impact of devolved 
policies that have sought to increase the supply 
of affordable housing to low-income households, 
alongside the impact of the right to buy in reducing 
the stock of social sector housing. It also examines 
the impact of policies in relation to the rents and 
affordability of social sector housing.
Chapter 4 details the way in which 
homelessness policies and legislation have 
developed in the four jurisdictions post-devolution. 
It pays particular attention to the growing 
importance of preventative measures, and also 
summarises the current position and concerns 
with regard to funding for housing-related support.
Chapter  focuses on the range of policies, 
including stock transfer and decent homes 
standards, which have sought to improve the 
quality of the housing stock in the four countries, 
as well on developments in housing management 
performance.
We conclude by offering some final 
observations on devolution and its impact on 
housing outcomes for low-income households.
We acknowledge that satisfactory housing 
outcomes are also dependent on neighbourhood 
quality. However, these issues are not explored in 
detail in this report as they are covered by a related 
JRF study (Adamson, 2009).12 Introduction
 Key policy documents
England
•  Department of the Environment, Transport 
and the Regions (2000) Quality and 
Choice: A Decent Home for All, London: 
DETR
•  Office of the Deputy Prime Minister (200) 
Sustainable Communities: Settled Homes 
– Changing Lives. A Strategy for Tackling 
Homelessness, London: ODPM
•  Communities and Local Government 
(2007) Homes for the Future: More 
Affordable, More Sustainable, London: 
CLG
Scotland
•  Scottish Executive (2000) Better Homes 
for Scotland’s Communities, Edinburgh: 
Scottish Executive
•  Homelessness Task Force (2002) An 
Action Plan for Prevention and Effective 
Response, Homelessness Task Force Final 
Report, Edinburgh: Scottish Executive
•  Scottish Government (2007) Firm 
Foundations: The Future of Housing 
in Scotland, Edinburgh: The Scottish 
Government
Wales
•  National Assembly for Wales (2001) Better 
Homes for People in Wales, Cardiff: NAW
•  Affordable Housing Task and Finish Group 
(2008) Report to the Deputy Minister 
for Housing, Cardiff: Welsh Assembly 
Government
•  Welsh Assembly Government (2009) Ten 
Year Homelessness Plan for Wales: 2009–
2019, Cardiff: WAG
Northern Ireland
•  Department for Social Development (2007) 
Including the Homeless: A Strategy to 
Promote the Inclusion of Homeless People, 
Belfast: DSD
•  Semple, J. (2007) Review into Affordable 
Housing, Final Report, Belfast: Department 
for Social Development13 The 1999 devolution settlement
The 1999 devolution settlement involved major 
constitutional and institutional changes, and 
formally devolved housing policy to the national 
administrations. However, even prior to 1999 
there had been a substantial degree of devolution 
in housing policy in practice, albeit that politically 
the lines of reporting were to Secretaries of State 
appointed from Westminster.
The forms of post-1999 devolution also 
differ substantially between Scotland, Wales 
and Northern Ireland, with the new institutional 
arrangements in part reflecting those in place 
before the 1999 settlement. In particular, the 
Scottish Government has the power to make 
primary legislation for housing policy, and the other 
functions within its devolved competence. But 
this follows on from a long-standing tradition of 
separate, if largely parallel, legislation for Scotland 
previously made at Westminster.
In contrast, the Welsh Assembly has to 
operate, primarily, within the framework of primary 
legislation for England and Wales passed in 
Westminster. While secondary legislation (orders) 
is now laid before the Welsh Assembly by Welsh 
Ministers, this is a development of the pre-
devolution arrangements where Welsh orders 
were laid before the Westminster parliament by the 
Secretary of State for Wales. While pre-devolution 
most Welsh orders tended to parallel their English 
equivalents, there were cases where they were 
distinctly different.
The legal position in Wales was subsequently 
amended by the Wales 2006 Act, which provides 
the Welsh Assembly with the opportunity to apply 
to Westminster for ‘derogation’ of specific areas of 
existing primary legislation, so that its operation in 
Wales can then be amended by orders laid before 
the Assembly. However, as seen in the recent 
case of the right to buy (discussed further below), 
Westminster does not automatically grant such 
requests for derogation.
Like Scotland, the Northern Ireland Assembly 
1  The 1999 devolution 
settlement
has full legislative powers in respect of devolved 
functions; however the Assembly was dissolved 
between 2002 and 2007, with devolved powers 
returning to the UK Secretary of State for Northern 
Ireland during that period.
Devolved housing powers and 
budgets
Housing is itself a wholly devolved function under 
the devolution settlement. However, its pursuit by 
the devolved administrations is hedged around 
by a number of related functions and policies that 
continue to be operated across the UK as a whole.
Among the continuing UK-wide functions, 
perhaps the most significant is the regulation 
of mortgage lenders. In addition, provisions for 
housing and related welfare benefits are made for 
Great Britain as a whole through the Department 
of Work and Pensions (DWP). In formal terms 
welfare benefits is a devolved function for the 
Northern Ireland Assembly, but in practice there 
is a ‘concordat’ whereby welfare benefits are 
operated within Northern Ireland in essentially the 
same way as applies throughout Great Britain 
(DWP and Department for Social Development 
Northern Ireland (DSDNI), 2002).
More generally the devolved administrations 
have to operate within the fiscal rules and financial 
provisions for overall departmental budgets set by 
HM Treasury. While the devolved administrations 
are free to set their own priorities within the global 
budget provisions made by HM Treasury, those 
budgets reflect decisions in Westminster, not 
just about the total levels of UK public spending 
provisions, but also about the priorities between 
different areas of expenditure.
The global budgets for the devolved 
administrations are determined by a complex set 
of formulas based on the budget provisions made 
for England. These are partly determined by the 
‘Barnett’ formula, which adjusts previous levels 14 The 1999 devolution settlement
of spending on a per capita basis (thus tending 
towards per capita equivalence over time), but for 
some functions other rules apply (HM Treasury, 
2007).
Arrangements for council housing subsidies 
are dealt with separately, and reflect differences 
in the financial regimes in Scotland, compared to 
England and Wales, that date back to 1989. There 
is also a different arrangement for Northern Ireland, 
where the Northern Ireland Housing Executive 
acts as the primary social sector landlord across 
Northern Ireland as a whole, instead of local 
authorities.
The council housing subsidy arrangements 
also lead to different accounting rules for capital 
expenditure. For Scottish councils that do not 
receive housing subsidy, all their borrowing 
has, since 2004, been treated as ‘prudential 
borrowing’, which counts against ‘annually 
managed expenditure’ (AME), but does not count 
against the ‘departmental expenditure limit’ (DEL) 
for the Scottish Government (HM Treasury, 2008).
In contrast, most council borrowing for housing 
investment in England and Wales is treated as 
‘supported borrowing’, and is counted against 
DEL. While this borrowing is linked to the council 
subsidy regime, it is treated as ‘supported’ 
borrowing whether the individual council is in 
subsidy, or in surplus. It is only any additional 
borrowing otherwise financed by the council’s own 
resources that is treated as prudential borrowing 
that is set against AME. Similarly most Northern 
Ireland Housing Executive (NIHE) borrowing also 
counts against DEL.
There are further ‘concordats’ that would 
enable HM Treasury to recoup additional housing 
benefit costs in the event of council rents in 
Scotland or Wales (or NIHE rents in Northern 
Ireland) being increased more rapidly than in 
England. In practice this has not arisen since 
1999. There are no similar arrangements in respect 
of housing association rent levels (HM Treasury, 
2007).
Devolved budgets
The ‘DEL’ budgets set for the devolved 
administrations varied from country to country 
over the post-devolution decade. Relative to total 
UK and England budgets, the Northern Ireland 
budget declined, while there was a slight rise in 
the budget for the Welsh Assembly. The Scottish 
budget moved more or less in line with the UK and 
England budget; but as noted above, following 
the introduction of the prudential borrowing 
regime, council housing investment in Scotland no 
Figure 1: Index of growth in total devolved budgets
Source: HM Treasury (2008)1 The 1999 devolution settlement
longer scores against DEL. The relative budgetary 
movements over the decade are shown in Figure 1 
(1988/89 = 100).
Despite those national variations in trends, 
total identifiable expenditure (which includes both 
DEL and AME for all government spending that 
can be attributed nationally) grew more slowly in 
all the devolved countries compared to England 
and the UK. In consequence the differentials in per 
capita spending between the countries narrowed, 
although it still remained higher in Northern Ireland, 
Scotland and Wales than in England as a whole, 
as can be seen in Figure 2.
In this context it should be noted that there 
is also substantial variation in per capita public 
spending between the English regions, and 
spending in London is at similar levels to Scotland, 
while spending in the North East and North 
West is at similar levels to Wales. Without an 
accepted methodology for determining the relative 
expenditure needs of each of the four countries 
(and the regions within England) there is no sound 
basis for arguing that, in overall terms, one country 
(or region) is treated more favourably than another 
(McLean et al., 2008).
If overall budget constraints for the devolved 
administrations are set by HM Treasury, the priority 
given to housing expenditure within those budget 
constraints is entirely a matter for the devolved 
administrations. A measure of the relative priority 
given to housing expenditure by the devolved 
administrations can be seen in the proportion of 
housing expenditure (gross housing investment 
plus revenue subsidy) they devote to housing; 
and how that has changed over the decade of 
devolution. This can be seen in Figure 3.
There are a number of points to note. The first 
is that the housing expenditure figures have been 
compiled from data supplied from each country (to 
the UK Housing Review), rather than taken from 
the HM Treasury Public Expenditure statistics. This 
is because the Treasury figures do not provide a 
consistent disaggregated series for housing over 
the whole devolution period. The long time series 
data in Public Expenditure Statistical Analyses 
(PESA) includes expenditure on water as part 
of the housing block, and this is treated very 
differently in the four countries.
The second is that there have been only limited 
changes in the different levels of relative priority 
given to housing within the national budgets over 
the period. Both Scotland and Northern Ireland 
continue to give a far higher priority to housing 
than England and Wales.
However, while in England the priority given 
to housing expenditure was rather higher over 
the decade, in Wales there was a decline, so that 
by the end of the decade Wales gave the lowest 
priority to housing expenditure of any of the four 
countries.
While these public expenditure figures do not 
take account of the impact of stock transfers, that 
switch investment to the private sector, this had a 
broadly similar impact on the proportion of retained 
council housing stock in England, Scotland and 
Wales over the decade. From 1998 to 2007 stock 
transfers accounted for 24, 19 and 16 per cent of 
the council stock at the beginning of the period in 
each country, respectively.
Conclusions
The 1999 devolution settlement has provided the 
devolved countries with significantly increased 
opportunities to determine their own futures. 
However, the devolution of housing powers is 
constrained by overall budget constraints set 
by HM Treasury, and UK-wide powers on key 
related functions such as the regulation of financial 
institutions and housing benefits.
The devolution settlements for each country 
are also constitutionally different; the Welsh 
settlement does not give it the power to make 
primary legislation, and the Northern Ireland 
settlement has been in suspension for much 
of the decade. But within those constraints the 
devolved countries have nonetheless far greater 
opportunities to develop their own policies and 
impose their own priorities than hitherto.16 The 1999 devolution settlement
Figure 3: Housing spend as a proportion of total attributable spend
Source: Wilcox (2008a); PESA, HM Treasury
Figure 2: Index of total per capita spending (UK = 100)
Source: Public Expenditure Statistical Analyses (PESA), HM Treasury17
2  Economic and social trends across  
the UK
Economic and social trends across the UK
Devolved housing policies are necessarily 
formulated and operated within the context of 
global and UK-wide economic and social trends, 
over which the devolved administrations have little 
influence. In particular the devolution decade was 
marked by a sustained period of economic growth, 
accompanied by rapid growth in house prices, 
and the development of large-scale competitive 
funding for investors in private rented housing.
While that growth came to an abrupt end with 
the ‘credit crunch’ in 2008, our primary focus is on 
the preceding decade, and Figure 4 shows how 
house price to income ratios for first-time buyers 
increased sharply across the whole of the UK over 
the decade, before easing back in 2008. However, 
it is notable that there was a much sharper growth 
in house prices in Northern Ireland in the years to 
2007, followed by a much sharper fall in 2008. 
The downturn in house prices in the fourth quarter 
of 2008 was also less marked in Scotland than 
elsewhere in the UK, so that the average figures for 
2008 as a whole still show house price to income 
ratios rising there.
The period of economic growth also saw a 
substantial reduction in levels of unemployment 
in all four countries (on both claimant and 
International Labour Organization (ILO) measures). 
Nonetheless while unemployment was far 
lower in all countries in 2007 compared with 
1998, it is notable that there was a small rise in 
unemployment rates in England and Wales post-
200, although they continued to fall in Scotland 
and Northern Ireland (Figure ).
However, perhaps the main point to note 
is that by 2008, unemployment rates in all four 
countries had virtually converged; as well as being 
at significantly lower rates compared to 1998.
Earnings also grew ahead of inflation over the 
decade in all four countries; albeit barely so in 
Wales, where gross median earnings grew by an 
average of 3.3 per cent per annum between 1999 
and 2008; compared to the Retail Price Index (RPI) 
Figure 4: National trends in home owner affordability
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of 3.0 per cent. Annual earnings grew on average 
by 3.9 per cent in Northern Ireland, close to the 
slightly higher level of 4.1 per cent per annum in 
both England and Scotland.
As a result of these changes, earnings in both 
Northern Ireland and Wales fell even further behind 
those in England and Scotland, and by the end of 
the decade median earnings in Wales had slipped 
below those in Northern Ireland (Figure 6).
 Low-income households in the four 
countries
These economic and housing market trends, 
as well as UK-wide government tax and benefit 
policies, had marked effects on the incidence and 
distribution of people with low incomes over the 
devolution decade, when incomes are measured 
both before and after housing costs.
The primary focus of this report is on the 
impact of devolved housing policies on low-
income households; and to that end we have 
focused wherever appropriate (and possible) on 
the impact for the 20 per cent of households (or 
individuals) with the lowest income (i.e. the lowest 
income quintile). While a number of alternative 
measures might have been adopted, this relatively 
simple measure is easier to operationalise across a 
number of different datasets.
However, as we have already seen, incomes 
vary between the four countries of the UK, and as 
a result the populations of these countries form 
different proportions of the UK-wide lowest income 
quintile. This can be seen in Figure 7, which shows 
the national distribution of the lowest quintile 
population in the years at the beginning of the 
devolution decade, and the years towards the end 
of the decade. In each case three years’ data have 
been aggregated to provide more robust samples.
The figures show the results of analyses of 
‘equivalised’ incomes from the Family Resources 
Survey (FRS); but as can be seen, data for the 
start years is only available for the countries of 
Great Britain, as the survey at that time did not 
cover Northern Ireland.
There are a number of points to note. The first 
is that on all measures the English and Scottish 
populations are under-represented in the UK 
lowest income quintile, while the Northern Ireland 
and Welsh populations are over-represented. A 
second point is that in England and Wales the 
proportions in the UK lowest income quintile 
measures are higher when incomes are measured 
after housing costs (AHC) than when they are 
measured before housing costs (BHC). In Northern 
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Ireland and Scotland the reverse is true.
On both measures the proportion of the 
English population in the UK lowest income 
quintile declined over the period. In Scotland the 
proportion declined on the AHC measure; but 
increased on the BHC measure. In Wales the 
reverse was true.
It would seem logical to look primarily to AHC 
measures of low incomes when considering the 
potential impact of devolved housing policies, 
but these are also impacted on by wider housing 
market trends. There are also marked differences 
in the tenure composition of the low-income 
populations in each of the four countries, as 
shown in Figure 8.
In particular it is notable that only in Scotland 
are more than a half of the lowest income 
population located in the social rented sector; 
and this reflects the larger size of the sector in 
Scotland. Looked at from another perspective, 
only 38 per cent of all those resident in the social 
rented sector in Scotland fall within the lowest 
income quintile.
While a smaller proportion of the overall low-
income population are resident in the social rented 
sector in the other three countries (and particularly 
so in Northern Ireland), it is also the case that in 
each of those countries a higher proportion of the 
total social sector population have low incomes 
(44 per cent in England, 49 per cent in Northern 
Ireland and 0 per cent in Wales).
Thus on the one hand it can be argued that 
the degree of tenure related social polarisation is 
far less marked in Scotland than in the other three 
countries. Conversely it can be argued that the 
benefits of a social sector tenancy are far less well 
targeted than in the other three countries.
It is also notable that over the devolution period 
the proportion of low-income people living in the 
social rented sector fell in all three of the countries 
in Great Britain, while the proportions living in 
the owner occupier sector rose. There were also 
increases in the minority of low-income people 
living in the private rented sector in England and 
Scotland; but there was a decline in Wales.
Alongside the decline in the proportion of 
low-income people in the social rented sector, 
there was also an increase in the degree of tenure-
based social polarisation in Scotland and Wales; 
albeit that the degree of polarisation remained 
lower in Scotland at the end of the period than 
it was in Wales at the beginning of the period. In 
contrast there was a slight easing in the degree 
of tenure based polarisation in England over the 
period, although again at a higher level than in 
Scotland. This is shown in Figure 9.
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Conclusions
There are above (UK) average proportions of low-
income populations in Northern Ireland and Wales; 
and below average proportions in England and 
Scotland. The highest incidence of low incomes 
is in Northern Ireland; and this was the case at 
both the beginning and the end of the devolution 
decade. The lowest incidence of low-income 
populations was in England at the beginning of 
the decade, and this remained the case on the 
BHC income measured at the end of the decade. 
However, on the AHC income measure at the end 
of the decade the incidence of low incomes was 
lowest in Scotland.
There are important differences in the tenure 
distribution of low-income households in the four 
countries. While there is a degree of concentration 
of low-income households in the social rented 
sector in all four countries, only in Scotland do 
more than a half of all those with low incomes 
reside in the social rented sector. Low incomes 
and social tenure are not synonymous, and an 
analysis of housing policy impacts on low-income 
households therefore needs to examine policies 
relating to all housing tenures, while at the same 
time recognising that the relative significance of 
those policies and tenures differs between the four 
countries.
The national evidence
The question of where the money goes is 
difficult to address at the national scale. Data 
on expenditure and resource distribution is 
only available at the local authority level from 
information compiled for national reporting. The 
first difficulty is that there may be inconsistencies 
in the ways that authorities record expenditure on 
street cleansing as it can be listed under different 
headings or combined with a range of other 
services. Thus, variations in the figures recorded 
may not reflect variations in actual expenditure or 
service levels. Indeed, recorded figures for street 
cleansing vary between zero and £42 per person 
in England, and between £8 and £2 per person in 
Scotland. The second difficulty is that we do not 
know how this expenditure is distributed between 
neighbourhoods or streets within each authority.
The case study analysis therefore provides 
a significantly more detailed picture on the 
distribution of resources to neighbourhoods but, 
for a wider set of authorities, we can at least 
explore variations in expenditure at the authority 
level.
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We can estimate differences in expenditure 
by neighbourhood characteristics by assuming 
that each authority distributes resources equally 
between different kinds of area. Figure 18 
suggests that expenditure is higher in authorities 
that are more deprived (i.e. it is higher in local 
authorities that have more wards in the higher 
deprivation bands). Figure 19 shows a similar 
picture for neighbourhood density. We have shown 
earlier that both deprivation and density are factors 
making for worse cleanliness outcomes. This 
evidence suggests that the issue is not one of 
there being no tendency for expenditure resources 
to relate to the difficulty of the task. Rather, the 
issue is whether the expenditure response is 
sufficient to the task, and also how it is used within 
local authorities.
We can also examine how levels of expenditure 
relate to outcomes. Figure 20 shows the picture 
for the 40 English local authorities for which we 
have data in the LEQSE while Figure 21 shows all 
32 Scottish local authorities. In both figures it is 
apparent that higher expenditure is not related to 
better outcomes; if anything, the relationship tends 
to be negative. There are good reasons why this 
might be the case. Some authorities may spend 
more because they face higher costs (for staff as 
in London) or because they have neighbourhoods 
that are more difficult to keep up to standard 
(i.e. more of the risk factors identified above) or 
because of the way in which they categorise 
expenditure data. It may also be that authorities 
are not targeting their resources according 
to needs at a neighbourhood level. The case 
study work attempts to understand this further. 
Crucially, this does not mean that in reality greater 
expenditure does not affect cleanliness.
We did attempt to carry out more complex 
modelling to see whether higher expenditure 
was associated with better outcomes once we 
controlled for neighbourhood characteristics. With 
two of the data sets (the SEH and the BVPI), there 
is a positive association between expenditure and 
environmental quality although the relationship 
is not very strong. This finding is not replicated 
in Scotland, where the number of separate local 
authorities is small, nor in an analysis of the 
LEQSE data. In these cases, the association of 
expenditure with outcomes is negative. We would 
not place great store on this analysis (and have 
not attempted to report it in detail) as we have very 
little information on how resources are distributed 
within authorities and that is obviously key. More 
detailed work with the case study data is reported 
below.
The case study evidence
The purpose of this section is to identify at the 
case study level how resources are distributed 
and how this affects outcomes. To start with, 
Table 1 provides headline statistics about service 
expenditure although Chapter 3 explains in more 
detail how these are made up. Total per capita 
expenditure is similar in Fife and Leeds although 
it is worth noting that, in Leeds, some of the 
expenditure comes from beyond core budgets 
through budgets for time-limited special initiatives. 
Lewisham has a higher per capita expenditure 
although, if we allow 2 per cent on salary costs 
for a London weighting, the more comparable 
figure would be £16.80. Lewisham’s figure is 
average for London.
The first issue is whether resources are 
spread evenly between more or less deprived 
neighbourhoods. Within each authority, we 
carried out extensive research to try to trace 
where the money went and we believe that the 
picture we have been able to produce provides a 
uniquely detailed insight. In brief, we identified the 
expenditure in each street as follows:
•  Programmed services were delivered through a 
combination of manual and mechanised street 
sweepers. We mapped the beats or routes that 
they followed, identifying how often they swept 
each street and how many other streets they 
had to sweep on the same round. This allowed 
us to estimate the share of programmed 
expenditure going to each street.
•  Responsive services were delivered by mobile 
teams, reacting to requests for services from 
the public and from other council staff. We 
identified how many requests were made in 
each street and hence the share of expenditure 
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•  In some cases, special initiatives 
provided additional services for particular 
neighbourhoods and that expenditure was also 
allocated out to streets based on the areas 
covered and records of activities undertaken.
This enables us to identify how expenditure 
was distributed across each authority in relation 
to levels of neighbourhood deprivation (Figure 
22). There are three slightly different patterns in 
evidence here. In Fife, expenditure is relatively 
equal in the more deprived half of streets but the 
less deprived streets get slightly less. Lewisham 
shows a steady increase of expenditure with 
deprivation, with a third more expenditure in the 
most deprived streets than in the most affluent 
streets within the authority. The Leeds case varies 
most, showing a fairly equal distribution in the 
most affluent half of the distribution but sharply 
increasing expenditure in the more deprived half. 
In Leeds, the most deprived streets have around 
five times as much spent on them as the least 
deprived, in part due to top-up Neighbourhood 
Renewal Fund (NRF) funding.
Recalling that cleanliness outcomes are 
generally worse in more deprived areas, however 
(see Figure 7 above), this picture of increasing 
resources targeted at deprived areas suggests 
an apparently salutary warning. The national 
analysis reached a similar conclusion as increased 
expenditure appeared to be associated negatively 
with outcomes. However, in Chapter 3 we are able 
to examine the evidence of the case studies much 
more closely. As will be seen, the case studies 
suggest a much more complex – and indeed 
more positive – view of the relationships between 
services, contexts and outcomes.
We can also examine the distribution of 
expenditure in relation to both low-income and 
high-density housing scores (Figures 23 and 24 
respectively). The most notable feature of these 
two charts is that the three authorities all have 
greater variation in expenditure by physical form 
than by social composition. In all three cases, 
there is a continuous increase in expenditure as 
density rises – particularly strong in Leeds. Only 
in Leeds, however, does expenditure also rise in 
line with the proportion of people on low income. 
In Lewisham, it is broadly flat and in Fife it peaks 
in the middle of the distribution. Yet the analysis in 
the second section above shows consistently that 
it is low income rather than density that is most 
strongly related to poor outcomes.
Targeting high-density areas will be a 
reasonable strategy in authorities where there is a 
strong correlation between that and low income 
but this correlation varies enormously between 
our three case studies alone. There is very little 
correlation in Lewisham (0.19) where high- and 
low-income groups are commonly found in 
terraced housing and flats (reflecting the cost of 
housing in London and the generally more dense 
form there). There is a much stronger correlation 
in Fife (0.60) and a moderate correlation in Leeds 
(0.3).
As with the national analysis, we carried out 
a range of investigations to try to identify whether 
greater expenditure had a positive impact on 
outcomes, once all the relevant neighbourhood 
characteristics had been taken into account. 
As previously, these models did not show clear 
positive relationships. This does not mean that 
more expenditure does not have a positive impact. 
There are a number of reasons why we have not 
been able to measure it: actual service levels may 
differ from the records in practice, particularly in 
the most difficult-to-clean areas; or there may 
be factors influencing outcomes that we are not 
capturing. Chapter 3 provides a more detailed 
exploration of this issue. 
Key messages
•  In both the national and the local analysis, 
there did appear to be a skewing of 
resources towards the more deprived 
neighbourhoods. The strength of skewing 
clearly varied between authorities.
•  In spite of this skewing, outcomes were 
worse in more deprived streets, suggesting 
that the nature or level of services there 
was still not sufficient.
•  In all three local authorities, resources were 
clearly skewed towards streets with higher 
densities but only in Leeds was there 
consistently higher expenditure in streets 
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analysis showed that it was that measure 
that was the single most significant 
indicator of poor standards. Local 
authorities may need more encouragement 
to use measures of social composition as 
the basis for targeting, rather than physical 
form.
•  The analysis does not show that more 
expenditure is associated with better 
outcomes, although there is some 
evidence for this from some parts of the 
analysis which follow.2
3 Promoting supply, access and affordability
The sharp rises in house prices across the UK 
over the decade (see Figure 4) focused attention 
on the issues of supply, access and affordability 
in all four countries. There was a particular focus 
in England on the issue of overall housing supply, 
highlighted and examined in detail in the Barker 
reports (Barker, 2004) This led to government 
targets set with the aim that new house building 
rates should be increased so that they at least 
matched projected levels of household growth, 
and the establishment of the National Housing 
and Planning Advisory Unit to advise and assist 
planning authorities in understanding and 
responding to these issues.
More recently, Scotland established a Housing 
Supply Task Force (Housing Supply Task Force, 
2009), and Northern Ireland set up the Semple 
Review on Affordability (Semple, 2007). This was 
also one of the many topics touched on in the 
Essex Review in Wales (Affordable Housing Task 
and Finish Group, 2008). However, while the 
issue of overall housing supply was recognised 
as a factor in terms of the affordability of market 
housing, for low-income households the supply of 
social sector housing at below market rents is of 
more immediate concern.
This chapter begins by examining the issues, 
and the responses in the four countries, related 
to the overall supply of housing, and its impact 
on the capacity for moderate income households 
to access the market sector. It then moves on to 
consider the issues and responses with respect to 
the supply of social sector rented dwellings, and in 
particular the impact of RTB policies. It concludes 
with a review of the affordability of social sector 
rents.
The overall supply of housing
First it is important to stress that shortfalls in 
the overall supply of housing played only a very 
limited role in the sharp rise in house prices over 
the devolution decade. Sustained economic 
growth, and interest rates maintained at relatively 
low levels in a low inflation environment, were 
the fundamental drivers of house price growth 
(Miles and Pilonca, 2007). Added to that, from 
2000 there was also an impact on prices from 
the new wave of investment in private rented 
housing, facilitated by the availability of ‘buy to let’ 
mortgages from mainstream lenders at competitive 
rates (Taylor, 2008).
Before the ‘credit crunch’, announced in the 
UK by the collapse of Northern Rock (with its high 
level exposure to the wholesale financial markets), 
there is also some evidence of an expectations 
based house bubble (Gall, 2007), with some 
lending practices acknowledged in retrospect to 
be somewhat excessive. These factors should 
not, however, be exaggerated as the greatest part 
of the house price rises can be accounted for by 
the fundamentals. The particularly acute rise (and 
subsequent fall) in house price rises in Northern 
Ireland in part relates to the cross-border effects 
of the economic and housing market boom south 
of the border, related to Ireland’s accession to the 
European Monetary Union.
All these factors were UK-wide, or driven 
by market forces over which the devolved 
administrations had little influence. The issue of 
housing supply is, however, an area of policy 
where the devolved administrations do have a 
greater measure of influence. In examining this 
issue the first question is simply how far, if at all, 
did housing supply fall short of household growth 
over the period prior to devolution, and over the 
devolution decade.
As Figure 10 shows, the crude balance 
of dwellings over households declined in 
England, Northern Ireland and Wales over the 
devolution decade; but there was no decline at 
all in Scotland. In all cases the decline primarily 
occurred in the years between 1981 and 1991 
(following the abrupt cessation of council house 
Three pathways to a clean sweep26 Promoting supply, access and affordability
building), and subsequently post-2001. There was 
only a marginal decline in Scotland in the decade 
between the 1991 and 2001 census; and no 
decline in the other three countries.
It should also be noted that the official figures 
tend to understate the balance of dwellings from 
2001 onwards, as official household estimates and 
projections have been adjusted to take account of 
under-reporting in the 2001 Census; while housing 
stock figures have been constrained to fit the 
unadjusted Census results. However, while this 
suggests that the balances from 2001 onwards are 
rather higher than shown by the figures, it does not 
throw into question the evidence of a diminishing 
balance in England, Northern Ireland and Wales in 
the years since 2001.
It is also clear that the issue is most acute in 
England, which by 2006 had by far the lowest 
crude household dwelling balance (2.0 per cent) 
of the four countries. Once second homes and 
vacant dwellings have been taken into account, 
this suggests an even tighter market.
Within England it should also be noted that 
there are sharp regional differences, with a large 
shortfall of supply concentrated in London and 
the wider South East of England, with little or no 
shortfall in other regions. The net crude balance 
of dwellings in London and the wider South East 
was just 1.6 per cent in 2006, compared to 2.6 
per cent in the rest of England. Net of unavoidable 
levels of vacant dwellings, due to normal turnover 
and refurbishment, and second homes, this 
implies a net shortfall of dwellings within London 
and the wider South East.
The second lowest household dwelling balance 
at the end of the devolution decade was in Wales, 
where the balance fell from .2 per cent in 1997 
to 3.3 per cent in 2006. Again, after allowing for 
second homes and vacant dwellings this suggests 
a very tight market.
Despite a sharp reduction over the decade, 
the balance in Northern Ireland in 2006 still 
represented 4.7 per cent of the total stock, only 
marginally lower than the constant 4.9 per cent 
balance in Scotland.
If the issues around the overall supply of 
housing were initially raised in the four countries in 
the context of concerns about rising house prices 
and home owner affordability, it is now clear there 
are even greater challenges ahead, both in terms 
of the higher levels of household growth indicated 
by the 2006 based projections, and the collapse of 
house building rates with the advent of the ‘credit 
crunch’. These changed market circumstances 
pose new challenges for national policies in the 
years ahead, with difficult trade-offs required 
between competing policy objectives.
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Housing supply and low-income 
households
If shortfalls in housing supply contribute to issues 
around the affordability of home ownership, they 
impinge on low-income households in different 
ways. Even in the more affordable years in the 
housing market cycle, very few low-income 
households (i.e. the lowest income quintile) move 
into home ownership.
A high proportion of extant home owner 
households that are poor entered the sector when 
they had higher incomes, and then subsequently 
became poor as a result of unemployment, 
sickness, divorce, separation or retirement 
(Burrows and Wilcox, 2000).
The very limited potential for low-income 
households to directly enter home ownership 
can be illustrated by 200 analyses of home 
owner affordability, that showed that over a fifth 
of all younger households in the UK were either 
economically inactive, or did not earn sufficient 
to pay a social sector rent without support from 
housing benefit. A further fifth could not afford to 
buy even at the low end of the housing market (i.e. 
at lowest decile house prices).
Altogether over two fifths of all younger 
households in England and Wales could not 
afford to access home ownership in 200. While 
affordability constraints were not so great in 
Northern Ireland and Scotland, 33 and 3 per 
cent, respectively of younger households could 
not afford to access home ownership in those 
countries (see Figure 11)
The same point can be made from the other 
direction. Data from the Regulated Mortgage 
Survey shows that only a tiny proportion of first-
time buyers have very low incomes. In 2006 one 
fifth of all households in Great Britain had gross 
incomes below £11,210 a year; while two fifths 
had incomes below £20,020 (Family Spending, 
2007). In the same year, only 1% of all first-time 
buyers in the UK had gross incomes below 
£11,00 a year, including buyers exercising the 
right to buy; and only 9 per cent had incomes 
below £20,20.
The critical issues for low-income households 
are thus primarily about access to the social rented 
sector. While the pressures on the sector are 
increased by the rising proportion of households 
unable to buy over the period, the policy domain 
where the devolved administrations can make a 
more direct impact is through the supply of social 
sector rented dwellings, and in other forms of 
‘affordable’ housing.
Figure 11: Proportion of younger households unable to buy in 200
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The supply of social sector 
dwellings
The devolved administrations can impact on the 
supply of social sector dwellings in a number of 
ways. The primary measures are the funding and 
provision of additional dwellings for the sector, 
and policies regulating the sale of dwellings from 
the sector. Both of these have a net impact on the 
stock of dwellings in the sector, and the numbers 
of lettings becoming available each year for new 
tenants. The changes in the size of the social 
sector stock in each of the four countries over the 
devolution decade are shown in Figure 12. This 
contrasts the stock levels in 2007 (the latest year 
for which data is available) with the stock in 1998.
Figure 12 clearly shows that the size of the 
stock declined in all four countries over the 
decade, with losses to the social rented sector 
stock through sales (and demolitions) exceeding 
the additions to the stock through new provision. 
Proportionately the decline was most rapid in 
Scotland and Northern Ireland, but nonetheless 
even at the end of the decade the social rented 
sector stock in Scotland formed a much larger 
proportion of the total stock than in the other three 
countries, as shown in Figure 13.
The decline in the levels of the social sector 
stock are also reflected in the levels of lettings 
available for new housing applicants. It should 
be noted, however, that there is a long time lag 
involved in the impact of right to buy sales on 
re-lets, with evidence (for England) suggesting 
that on average right to buy purchasers remain 
in occupation for some 1 years after the year of 
purchase (Wilcox, 2006a).
The immediate impact of sales on levels of 
re-lets is consequently quite small, but builds up 
gradually over a long period. Conversely it follows 
that policies to restrict future sales do nothing to 
prevent the continuing impact of earlier sales, and 
in turn take some time before its effects are felt on 
future re-let levels.
Figure 14 shows that the levels of re-lets 
available to new tenants declined in all four 
counties over the decade. However, some caution 
is required with the data, as indicated in the notes 
to the figure. In addition, the sharp decline shown 
in the level of lettings in Scotland in 2003 is in 
large measure a consequence of a hiatus in data 
collection following the three large local authority 
stock transfers that year.
English local authority figures exclude non-
secure lettings to the homeless from 2003/04. 
‘New’ tenants include existing tenants moving 
between the local authority and housing 
association sectors
Figure 12: Decline in social rented stock
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Figure 13: Social rented stock as a proportion of total housing stock
Source: Wilcox (2008a)
Figure 14: Lettings to new tenants decline in all four countries
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The decline in lettings over the period is not, 
however, solely a function of sales and new build 
levels. Levels of re-lets also tend to rise and fall 
over the housing market cycle, as housing market 
affordability constraints impact on the capacity 
of existing tenants to move out of social housing, 
as well as the level of demand from households 
wishing to enter the sector.
As indicated, a number of factors have 
contributed to the net decline in the size of the 
social sector stock in the four countries, and 
these are examined in turn below, starting with 
a consideration of programmes to invest in new 
social rented dwellings.
Precise figures on total numbers of new 
additions to the social rented stock, in a 
comparable format across all four countries, 
are not readily available. Figures on new build 
are available for all countries; but figures on 
outputs from national government budgets, or 
stock additions through the acquisition (and 
improvement or conversion) of existing dwellings 
are not so readily or consistently available. Data for 
Scotland, however, shows that over the last eight 
years, additions to the social rented sector stock 
as a result of government funded acquisitions and 
rehabilitation ran at around 10 per cent of the level 
of new build completions.
There are even greater constraints on data on 
numbers of new dwellings funded from housing 
associations’ own resources, or as part of planning 
agreements. Analysis of the ‘S106’ planning 
arrangements in England suggests that very few 
new social rented dwellings are funded without any 
government grant input (compared to a greater 
– but still small – number of shared ownership 
dwellings) (Monk, 200). A more recent analysis in 
Wales, however, suggests that at least in the last 
year before the credit crunch, S106 agreements 
had added at least a quarter to the numbers of 
new social rented dwellings provided in that year 
(Welsh Economy Research Unit, 2008).
In Scotland, new build social rented sector 
completions were at a higher level in the devolution 
decade than in most of the preceding years 
(although the 1998 completion figures were 
atypically low). In England completions fell in the 
initial post-devolution years; but rose again in the 
second half of the decade, so that completions 
in 2006 and 2007 were higher than in 1998. 
However, they still remained at a lower level than 
the average for the six years prior to devolution.
New build social sector completions fell over 
the decade in both Wales and Northern Ireland, 
and in both cases the 1998 completions levels 
were already well below those in the preceding 
years (Figure 1).
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In all four countries, funding for new housing 
association dwellings increased over the devolution 
period. However, funding in Wales initially declined, 
and this only began to be reversed from 200/06, 
and the overall net increase was less pronounced 
than in the other three countries; while in Northern 
Ireland a substantial new build contribution 
was also made by NIHE in the early devolution 
years. Consequently in both those countries 
the increased housing association funding was 
insufficient to support any increase in new social 
rented sector outputs over the decade to 2007 
(Figure 16).
It should also be noted that in England a rising 
proportion of the investment programme was 
devoted to a range of low cost home ownership 
schemes in recent years (not included in Figure 
1). In the first half of the devolution decade, this 
comprised less than one sixth of the housing 
corporation investment budget; in 2007/08 it had 
risen to over a fifth of the total budget. However, 
because of the lower unit costs it resulted in some 
two fifths of the total outputs for the year.
The low cost home ownership schemes 
make a number of important social contributions. 
They do not, however, typically make a direct 
contribution to meeting the needs of those 
households with the lowest incomes. Thus in 
2006/07, for example, while the average net 
income for new social sector tenants in England 
was £9,997 a year, the average gross income for 
households benefiting from the range of low cost 
home ownership schemes was £27,084 (Centre 
for Housing Research, 2007); this was higher than 
the gross median household income (£2,860).
Thus while low cost home ownership schemes 
may assist households otherwise unable to access 
home ownership, and contribute to the social and 
economic mix in new housing schemes, at best 
they remove an element of competing demand 
for social rented housing from moderate income 
households; they do not directly contribute 
towards meeting the housing needs of households 
with the lowest incomes.
The impact of the right to buy
The other policy impacting on the stock of social 
rented sector dwellings, and more gradually 
over time on levels of lettings, is the right to buy 
(RTB). This is a policy area where there have been 
significant policy changes post-devolution, that 
have over the decade begun to impact on levels of 
sales, and levels of discounts.
RTB enables ‘better off’ council tenants with 
moderate incomes to purchase their homes at 
a substantial discount from open market vacant 
possession values. Thus, while there are some 
Figure 16: Trends in public funding for new housing association affordable housing
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positive arguments in favour of the RTB, it is not 
a policy that directly assists a significant number 
of low-income households. Tenant purchasers 
tend to have higher incomes than households 
that become, or remain as, social sector tenants; 
albeit they also tend to have lower incomes than 
households moving into shared ownership and 
other low cost home ownership schemes.
For example, the average gross income of 
council and housing association sitting tenant 
purchasers in the UK in 2006 was £2,820; only 
10 per cent had incomes below £13,260 – well 
above the £11,210 level of lowest quintile incomes 
for all households in that year.
The issues for low-income households are thus 
more about the impact of sales, and the use of the 
receipts from sales, on the future supply of social 
lettings for low-income households, and on the 
impact of sales on neighbourhoods.
In all four countries RTB sales (including NIHE 
sales to sitting tenants) rose in the early devolution 
years, in response to rising house prices (and 
house price expectations). However, from 2003 
onwards they began to fall, partly as prices had 
moved beyond the reach of tenants, and partly in 
response to the new policies introduced to limit 
the impact of the right to buy, as discussed below 
(Figure 17).
While sales fell over the decade in all four 
countries, the levels of sales fell most in Northern 
Ireland, and least in Scotland.
Nonetheless over the decade the sales in 
Northern Ireland were highest as a proportion of 
the social sector stock remaining in 2007 (32 per 
cent); compared to 23 per cent in Scotland, 1 per 
cent in Wales and 13 per cent in England.
All the devolved administrations have since 
1999 introduced measures designed to limit the 
impact of the RTB, but the policy approaches 
have differed between the four countries, and 
in particular between the policies adopted in 
Scotland, compared to those in England, Wales 
and Northern Ireland.
Table 1: Current maximum RTB discounts




Northern Ireland 2002 £24,000




London, South East 1999 £38,000
East 1999 £34,000
South West 1999 £30,000
North West, West Midlands 1999 £26,000
East Midlands, Yorkshire  
& Humber
1999 £24,000
North East 1999 £22,000
High pressure areas in South 
East
2003 £16,000
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In England, Wales and Northern Ireland, 
effective discount levels have been reduced with 
the introduction of lower national and regional 
‘caps’ on maximum discounts (Table 1), while the 
Housing Act 2004 lengthened the qualifying time 
for RTB eligibility to five years and made a number 
of other detailed amendments to its operation in 
England and Wales.
In contrast Scotland has introduced the 
‘modernised RTB’ in 2002, under which tenants 
qualify for a 20 per cent discount after five years, 
and then an extra 1 per cent discount for each 
subsequent year of their tenancy, rising to a 
maximum of 3 per cent after 20 years. There is 
also a maximum cash limit of £1,000. However, 
the ‘modernised’ RTB only applies to new tenants 
since 2002, and existing tenants are still eligible for 
the old RTB, which in Scotland is not subject to 
any cash cap on maximum discounts.
Scotland has also taken (and applied) the 
power to suspend the operation of the modernised 
right to buy in selected ‘high housing pressure 
areas’ (but not the old RTB). In contrast in 2003 
England introduced a lower maximum £16,000 
discount cap in selected high housing pressure 
areas (most of London and a number of other 
areas in the South East). Wales also reduced its 
maximum discount to £16,000 in 2003, and more 
recently has also sought the power to suspend the 
RTB in high housing pressure areas.
These various measures have resulted not 
just in the substantial decline in the numbers of 
sales shown above, but also the average level 
of achieved RTB discount in England, Northern 
Ireland and Wales (see Figure 18). Recently 
available data for England and Wales shows a 
further decline in achieved discount rates in Wales 
in 2008, along with further sharp falls in the levels 
of RTB sales in both countries. However, average 
discount rates have not yet fallen in Scotland, 
as to date the great majority of sales have been 
under the old uncapped RTB, rather than the 
‘modernised’ RTB.
An economic assessment of the RTB suggests 
that the ‘discount’ levels of the modernised RTB 
are broadly in line with the economic value of 
RTB sales (Wilcox, 2006a). This is because they 
are sales to sitting tenants with an entitlement 
to a sub-market rent, who on average remain in 
residence for a further 1 or so years following the 
RTB sale. They are not open market sales with 
vacant possession.
On that basis sales that provide sufficient 
receipts to invest in two new social rented 
dwellings from day one broadly balances out with 
the loss of three re-lets 1 years hence (based 
on HM Treasury investment methodology). There 
is no need for a ‘1 for 1’ replacement as the RTB 
households are the same households allocated 
their rented dwellings on the basis of housing 
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need; it is just that post-RTB they occupy the 
dwellings as owners rather than tenants.
In practice the problem flowing from the 
RTB for low-income households is that in the 
past discounts have been at excessive levels, 
but also that receipts from sales have not been 
used to reinvest in new rented stock. Rules on 
the use of receipts vary from country to country, 
but in all cases they have in practice been used 
predominantly to reduce new central government 
financial provisions and/or to invest in the 
refurbishment of the retained council stock.
In the short run the cash limits in England, 
Northern Ireland and Wales have provided a ‘quick 
fix’ to bring down discount levels to a point where 
they represent value for money to the public 
sector. In the first decade of devolution, Scotland 
has continued with sales at high values that 
impose a substantial net replacement cost on the 
public sector.
Nonetheless the modernised RTB in Scotland 
offers a better longer-term balance between 
providing tenure choice to existing social sector 
tenants, and protecting public sector finances, 
and thus the resources available for low-income 
households. If there is a case for Scotland to 
consider further measures to reduce discount 
levels for pre-2002 tenants, there is a case for 
the other three countries to consider the case for 
structural reforms to the RTB along similar lines to 
the Scottish ‘modernised’ RTB.
However, it should be added that the economic 
evaluation above does not support the case for 
the suspension of the RTB in high pressure areas. 
Rather it suggests that provided that discounts are 
net set at excessive levels, then the more critical 
concern is to ensure that sales receipts are applied 
to provide a new supply of social lettings in those 
areas.
The affordability of social sector 
rents
The devolved administrations have full formal 
control over social sector rent levels and policies, 
although the Scottish Government currently 
has taken only very limited ‘reserve’ powers to 
intervene in respect of decisions by councils on the 
rents of their housing stock. They are, however, 
subject to financial constraints under the various 
‘concordats’, that in effect would mean that if 
they chose to increase council rents more rapidly 
than was the case in England, then the devolved 
administrations would be required to meet the 
consequential additional housing benefit costs 
from within their own budgets. That constraint 
does not apply, however, to housing association 
rents.
In practice council rents in Scotland and 
Wales, and NIHE rents in Northern Ireland, have 
increased less rapidly than those in England 
over the devolution decade. However, while in 
the initial devolution years this led to the UK 
Treasury making additional payments to the 
devolved administrations (for the consequential 
housing benefit savings), that arrangement was 
subsequently suspended, on the grounds that it 
was only intended to protect HM Treasury in the 
event of higher rent increases by the devolved 
administrations.
The changes in the levels of average council 
and housing association rents are shown in 
Figures 19 and 20. In England council rents 
increased in line with median full time earnings 
over the decade, while in Scotland and Northern 
Ireland the lower rate of rent increases meant that 
they declined relative to median full time earnings 
over the decade. While rent increases in Wales 
were less rapid than in England, earnings growth in 
Wales was lower over the decade, with the result 
that council rents rose slightly relative to earnings 
over the decade.
While lower council rents are clearly more 
affordable for tenants, they also represent less 
income being available for expenditure on repairs 
and improvements, and in both Scotland and 
Northern Ireland there would have been the 
opportunity to increase rental income by almost 
1 per cent per annum, without increasing rents 
either relative to earnings, or more rapidly than in 
England (and thus incurring budgetary costs).
The relative changes in housing association 
rents over the period were quite different. Housing 
association rent increases over the decade were 
lowest in England, under the impact of the ‘rent 
restructuring’ policy intended to create more 
consistency in rent levels both between the council 
and housing association sectors, and between 
individual landlords.
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remained higher than council rents by the end of 
the decade, the gap between rent levels in the 
two sectors was significantly smaller. In Scotland 
housing association rents increased at the 
same rate as council rents over the decade and 
consequently also became more affordable relative 
to earnings.
In Wales housing association rents increased 
a little more slowly than council rents, and in 
consequence moved broadly in line with earnings 
over the decade.
In Northern Ireland, under pressures to 
maximise outputs from a limited grant budget, 
housing association rents increased sharply over 
the decade. However, by 2007 they still remained 
the lowest in the UK; albeit by then they were 
some  per cent higher than NIHE rents, whereas 
at the beginning of the devolution decade they had 
been substantially lower than NIHE rents (Figure 
20).
Conclusions
Only in Scotland did overall housing supply match 
household formation over the decade. It lagged 
behind in England, Northern Ireland and Wales, 
and as a result crude household dwelling balances 
fell and housing markets tightened. Balances were 
lowest in England at the end of the decade, and 
Figure 19: Increases in council rents
especially so in the south of England.
The stock of social sector dwellings, which 
are of greatest significance for low-income 
households, also fell in all four countries over the 
decade. In all cases stock losses through right to 
buy sales (and some demolitions) outstripped the 
provision of new stock. The falls were greatest in 
Northern Ireland and Scotland, but at the end of 
the decade social sector dwellings still comprised 
a quarter of the total stock in Scotland; far higher 
than in the other three countries.
The rate of new social sector completions 
substantially increased in Scotland over the 
decade, but fell slightly in Northern Ireland and 
Wales. In England new social sector completions 
initially fell, before rising again, and in 2006 and 
2007 were higher than at the beginning of the 
devolution decade. Those trends reflected critical 
– and different – decisions on investment priorities 
by the four countries over the decade.
If Scotland placed the highest priority on the 
provision of new social sector housing, it also 
saw, proportionately, the largest losses of social 
sector stock through the RTB. This reflected the 
absence in Scotland of any inherited provisions to 
cap maximum RTB discounts, and the decision 
to introduce a new and more limited version of 
the RTB only for new tenants from 2002, with 
no changes to the RTB of existing tenants. In 36 Promoting supply, access and affordability
Figure 20: Increases in housing association rents
Rents are net of service charges. Northern Ireland figures for 1998 and 1999 are estimates
contrast, existing powers were used to reduce 
the capped maximum level of RTB discounts in 
England, Northern Ireland and Wales, and this led 
a sharper decline in levels of RTB sales compared 
to Scotland.
Average right to buy discounts were reduced 
to under 2 per cent in England, Northern Ireland 
and Wales by 2007 as a result of national, regional 
and local caps on maximum discounts. Average 
discounts remained over 0 per cent in Scotland, 
as the 2002 modernised right to buy for new 
tenants had not by 2007 had any significant 
impact, and the Scottish right to buy for existing 
tenants never included powers to set a maximum 
cash limit on discounts.
The policies in England, Northern Ireland and 
Wales have both been more effective in reducing 
stock losses through the RTB, and in reducing 
discounts to levels that represent reasonable 
value to the public sector (given that they are 
sales to sitting tenants with the right to occupy 
at substantially sub-market rents and not vacant 
possession sales).
Looking forward, the discount structure of the 
Scottish modernised RTB strikes a better balance 
in supporting the objective of promoting choice 
and the option of ownership for tenants, without 
imposing any net costs in terms of public sector 
value for money. However, the uncapped ‘old’ RTB 
in Scotland still results in higher levels of stock 
losses, and considerable net public sector costs.
Council rents in England increased in line with 
earnings over the decade. In proportional terms 
they increased a little more slowly in the other three 
countries. However, because of slower earnings 
growth they increased as a proportion of earnings 
in Wales.
Housing association rents in England, Scotland 
and Wales all rose a little less than earnings over 
the decade, although in all cases they remained 
rather higher than council rents. While they rose 
more sharply in Northern Ireland, by 2007/08 they 
were only slightly higher than NIHE rents, having 
been below them at the beginning of the decade.37 Addressing homelessness
4  Addressing homelessness
There has been a frenetic level of policy activity 
on homelessness in the UK since 1999, 
driven forward by central government and the 
establishment of bespoke structures to implement 
and monitor change.
In England, the Government established 
the Homelessness Directorate in 2002, which 
incorporated the former Rough Sleepers Unit, 
as well as the Bed & Breakfast Unit and the 
Homelessness Policy Team. The use of statistical 
targets, financial incentives, extensive good 
practice guidance, and ‘practitioner-advisors’ 
drawn from local government, have all been key to 
the Homelessness Directorate’s1 notable success 
in implementing the government’s agenda in 
England.
In Scotland, a Homelessness Task Force (HTF) 
was established shortly after devolution in 1999, 
chaired by the Minister for Social Justice, but with 
members drawn from across the statutory and 
voluntary sectors. The Homelessness Monitoring 
Group is the successor body to the HTF, charged 
with overseeing implementation of the legislative 
and other recommendations contained in the 
HTF’s two key reports (Homelessness Task Force, 
2000, 2002).
The Welsh Assembly Government (WAG) 
also took an early interest in homelessness, 
with a multi-agency Homelessness Commission 
established in 2000. The first National 
Homelessness Strategy was published in 
2003 and revised in 200. Following extensive 
consultation, a Ten-Year Homelessness Plan for 
Wales was published in July 2009.
There has been less policy progress on 
homelessness in Northern Ireland than elsewhere 
in the UK in recent years, in large part because 
devolution has been suspended for much of 
the decade. A multi-sectoral Working Group 
on Homelessness was established by the 
Department for Social Development in 2001, but 
a homelessness strategy for the Province did not 
appear until 2007, and the associated legislative 
changes have yet to be implemented.
This chapter examines the substantive 
homelessness policies pursued via these varying 
governance arrangements, and evidence on their 
outcomes. It begins by considering legislative 
divergence on homelessness across the UK in 
the post-devolution period, as well as trends in 
statutory homelessness and rehousing practices. It 
then considers the important recent developments 
on homelessness prevention in the various UK 
countries, before attention is given to the role 
played by housing-related support in addressing 
the needs of homeless people and those at risk.
Legislative divergence post-
devolution
Core to all policy responses to homelessness in 
the UK is the legislative framework first established 
in the Housing (Homeless Persons) Act 1977. This 
framework provides that local authorities2 must 
ensure that accommodation is made available to 
households which are ‘eligible’ for assistance,3 
‘unintentionally homeless’, and in ‘priority need’. 
The principal priority need groups are households 
which contain dependent children, a pregnant 
woman or a ‘vulnerable’ adult. This ‘main 
homelessness duty’ can be transferred between 
local authorities if an applicant has no ‘local 
connection’ with the area of the local authority to 
which they have applied and does have a local 
connection with another UK authority in which they 
do not run the risk of violence.
The original 1977 Act covered all of Great 
Britain, but was subsequently incorporated 
into separate legislation for England/Wales and 
Scotland. The homelessness legislation was 
extended to Northern Ireland in 1989.
There has been substantial legislative 
divergence on homelessness since devolution. 
Most notably, Scotland has significantly 38 Addressing homelessness
strengthened its statutory safety net, culminating 
in the highly ambitious target that virtually all 
homeless people in Scotland will be entitled to 
rehousing by 2012 (Anderson, 2009). This target 
is to be achieved, principally, by the gradual 
expansion and then abolition of ‘priority need’ 
status. An interim target has been set for all local 
authorities in Scotland to reduce their proportion 
of ‘non-priority’ assessments by 0 per cent by 
2009. The Homelessness Etc. (Scotland) Act 
2003, which provided the legislative basis for 
this phasing out of priority need, also allowed 
for a significant softening of the impact of the 
intentionality provisions and for suspension of the 
local connection referral rules (although neither of 
these amendments have been brought into force 
as yet). This expansion of the statutory safety 
net was made possible, in part, by the relative 
advantage that Scotland enjoys compared with 
other parts of the UK with respect to the supply 
of social housing – a relative advantage that has 
diminished over the devolution period. England, 
and to a lesser extent Wales, seem to be moving 
in the opposite direction. This may seem surprising 
given that the Homelessness Act 2002 repealed 
the two-year time limit on the main homelessness 
duty in England and Wales (introduced by the 
Conservatives in the Housing Act 1996), and 
secondary legislation also expanded the categories 
of ‘priority need’ in both countries to include, for 
example, 16/17-year-olds, care leavers and adults 
vulnerable due to violence or an institutionalised 
background. However, the vigorous 
implementation of the ‘homelessness prevention’ 
approach in recent years could be seen as raising 
the statutory assessment threshold, and in this 
respect represents a ‘rolling back’ of the safety net 
(see below).
The legislative framework on homelessness in 
Northern Ireland has remained largely unchanged 
since its introduction in 1989. While forthcoming 
legislation is expected to introduce some reforms 
that will bring it closer to the current position 
elsewhere in the UK – such as strengthened 
protection for 16- and 17-year-olds and care 
leavers – it is not anticipated that there will be 
fundamental alterations to the statutory safety net 
in the Province.
Trends in statutory homelessness
In England, the number of statutory homeless 
acceptances rose steeply in the late 1990s and 
early 2000s, as housing affordability deteriorated, 
squeezing many low-income households out of the 
Figure 21: Households accepted as owed the main homelessness duty in the UK (1998/99 to 2007/08)
Source: Communities and Local Government (CLG), Scottish Government, WAG, and NIHE. Note that data are 
unavailable for Northern Ireland until 2000/0139 Addressing homelessness
only around one third in England, and about half in 
Wales and Northern Ireland.
A key driver of much recent homelessness 
policy has been concerns about the large numbers 
of statutorily homeless households in temporary 
accommodation awaiting rehousing. As Figure 22 
shows, the number of households in temporary 
accommodation rose sharply in England and 
Wales in the early 2000s before beginning 
to fall (albeit not as quickly as homelessness 
acceptances), whereas temporary accommodation 
placements have continued to climb in Scotland.
Housing homeless people
The ultimate test of this statutory system is, of 
course, the extent to which households accepted 
as homeless are actually rehoused and sustain 
that housing.
Statutorily homeless households are entitled 
to ‘reasonable preference’ in the allocation of local 
authority housing throughout the UK; in Scotland 
they are also entitled to reasonable preference in 
housing association allocations. Again in Scotland 
only, there is a legal duty on housing associations 
to rehouse statutorily homeless households 
referred to them by a local authority within six 
weeks, unless they have a ‘good reason’ not 
to do so (with the exemptions narrowly drawn). 
Elsewhere, housing associations are required 
to assist local authorities with respect to their 
homelessness duties, and local authorities have 
substantial nomination rights in respect of the 
lettings made by housing associations.
In all parts of the UK, the main homelessness 
duty can be discharged via the offer of an 
‘assured’ tenancy in the private rented sector 
(with security of tenure), as well as via the offer of 
a social tenancy. The Scottish Government has 
recently consulted on legislative amendments 
which would also allow for discharge of duty 
into fixed-term private tenancies (‘short assured 
tenancies’) with the applicant’s consent, so long 
as certain other conditions were met (e.g. with 
respect to tenancy length). This would bring 
Scotland broadly into line with the current position 
in England and Wales. There appear to be no 
plans in Scotland for ‘compulsory’ discharge of 
duty into fixed-term private tenancies (i.e. without 
the applicant’s consent) as have been mooted in 
England.
market (see Figure 21). Since 2003/04, however, 
there has been an unprecedented reduction in 
homeless acceptances in England, with the total 
halving by 2007/08. In Wales, similarly, there was a 
sharp upward trend in homelessness acceptances 
until 2004/0, but this has since reversed. In 
Scotland, homelessness acceptances grew 
steadily up to 200/06, but have since dropped 
back slightly; a broadly similar pattern is evident in 
Northern Ireland.
Current rates of both homelessness 
presentations (‘decisions made’ on those seeking 
assistance) and acceptances (those assessed as 
owed the main duty) differ significantly across the 
UK countries – both are much higher in Scotland, 
and especially in Northern Ireland than in England 
and Wales (see Table 2).
Table 2: Homelessness presentations and 
acceptances per thousand households in the UK, 
by country in 2007/08 












Source: CLG, Scottish Government, WAG, and NIHE. 
Assumes 21 million households in England, 2.7 million 
in Scotland, 1.24 million in Wales and 0.67 million in 
Northern Ireland; note that all these are projections 
based on the 2001 Census conducted within each of the 
countries at different points during the last 3–4 years.
With respect to Northern Ireland, the 
explanation for this exceptionally high level of 
statutory homelessness may lie in the sharp 
deterioration in housing affordability experienced 
in the province in recent years (Gray and Long, 
2009). With regard to Scotland, it is likely that its 
more extensive statutory safety net encourages 
a higher proportion of homeless households, 
particularly single homeless households, to 
approach their local authority for help.4 Such 
‘single’ households (i.e. without dependent 
children or a pregnant woman) comprise 
approximately two thirds of those accepted as 
statutorily homeless in Scotland, as compared with 40 Addressing homelessness
While data on discharge of duty is not directly 
comparable across the UK countries, it is clear that 
by far the most common outcome of the statutory 
process is acceptance by the household of a 
social rented tenancy. Only very small proportions 
of households owed the main duty accept a 
tenancy in the private rented sector (around 6 per 
cent in England6 and less elsewhere).7
Significant numbers of statutorily homeless 
households (up to one third in total across the UK) 
‘leak’ out of the statutory system without being 
rehoused because they voluntarily leave temporary 
accommodation, refuse a ‘suitable’ tenancy, return 
to previous accommodation, lose contact with the 
local authority before duty is discharged, etc. (see 
also O’Callaghan et al., 1996).
There is no data currently available on patterns 
of tenancy sustainment among those rehoused as 
homeless in any of the UK countries.8 However, 
administrative data on ‘repeat homelessness’ in 
Scotland indicates that around 20 per cent of 
all applications are from households who have 
applied as homeless on at least one previous 
occasion. A key driver of multiple homelessness 
applications appears to be a need for support with 
drug or alcohol problems.9
There is no routinely published data on repeat 
statutory homelessness anywhere else in the 
UK, but survey evidence from England in 200 
indicated that 13 per cent of statutorily homeless 
families had made a previous homelessness 
application (Pleace et al., 2008). Earlier research 
in England (O’Callaghan et al., 1996) had 
suggested a higher figure – that around a quarter 
of all homeless applicants had made a previous 
application at some point. However, this earlier 
study included single people whom we know 
are much more likely than families to apply for 
homelessness assistance repeatedly.
‘Squeezing out’ other groups in housing 
need?
A long-standing concern with the statutory 
system is the extent to which lettings to homeless 
households ‘crowd out’ lettings to other 
households, potentially exacerbating ‘perverse 
incentives’ to take the ‘homeless route’ as a 
‘fast-track’ to a social tenancy (Hills, 2007). The 
available evidence, while limited, is not suggestive 
of widespread manipulation of the homelessness 
provisions (Pleace et al., 2008), but questions of 
‘fairness’ with respect to social housing allocations 
to this group remain (see below).
As Figure 23 demonstrates, the proportion 
of local authority lets to new tenants made to 
statutorily homeless households has risen in 
Figure 22: Households in temporary accommodation in Great Britain (1998–2008)
Source: Communities and Local Government, Scottish Government, and WAG. These are ‘stock’ figures on the 
numbers in temporary accommodation at end of the first quarter of each year for England and Scotland, but for the 
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all four countries in the UK in the period since 
devolution. However, in England this increase 
started to reverse from 2004/0, so that by 
2007/08 it stood at 28 per cent (similar to the 
figure back in 1998/99 of 2 per cent). The 
proportion of lets allocated to statutorily homeless 
households remains much larger in some high 
demand areas in England – particularly inner 
London.
In Wales, there has been an extraordinary four-
fold increase in the proportion of local authority lets 
made to statutorily homeless households since 
devolution – from 8 per cent in 1998/99 to 34 per 
cent by 2006/07. However, this figure did drop 
back to 31 per cent in 2007/08, probably reflecting 
the recent decline in homelessness acceptances in 
Wales (see above).
In Scotland, too, the proportion of local 
authority lets made to homeless households has 
grown rapidly over the past decade. While the 
national figure stood at 48 per cent in 2007/08, 
this masks strong variations between Scottish 
local authorities (Pawson and Davidson, 2008). 
The proportion of local authority lets absorbed 
by statutorily homeless households seems set to 
grow further in many areas of Scotland, as the 
widening of priority need takes place.
The proportion of NIHE and housing 
association allocations in Northern Ireland made 
to statutory homeless households has doubled 
in the period since devolution. It now stands at 
71 per cent of all social lettings to new tenants in 
the Province – the highest level in any of the UK 
countries by some margin.10
The proportion of housing association lets 
to new tenants made to statutorily homeless 
households has also risen sharply in recent years: 
from 11 per cent in England in 1998/99 to 23 per 
cent by 2007/08; and in Scotland, from 13 per 
cent in 2003/04 to 2 per cent by 2007/08. In 
Wales, the equivalent figure was 14 per cent in 
2006/07 and 16 per cent in 2007/08 (earlier trend 
data is not available for Wales).
Thus, across the UK there are often relatively 
high, and in some cases growing, proportions 
of social housing lettings absorbed by statutorily 
homeless households. This is linked to the 
decline in the overall number of lets available to 
new tenants in all four countries, as discussed in 
Chapter 3. In an allocation system based primarily 
on ‘housing need’, the extent to which this trend 
is of concern turns largely on whether statutorily 
Figure 23: Percentage of local authority lets to new tenants made to statutory homeless households 
(1998/99 to 2007/08)
Source: Wilcox (2008a). Note that the figures for England, Scotland and Wales are restricted to local authority lettings, 
whereas in Northern Ireland both NIHE and housing association lettings are included42 Addressing homelessness
homeless households are in fact more ‘needy’ 
than other households seeking social housing.
Data from CORE confirms that statutorily 
homeless households are a more socially 
disadvantaged group than other new social 
tenants in England. As Table 3 shows, tenants 
who are rehoused as statutorily homeless are 
significantly more likely to be lone parents than 
other new tenants, are less likely to be in work, 
and have a lower average weekly income. There is 
a similar pattern evident in Scotland (though based 
on less reliable data). There is no equivalent data 
for Wales or Northern Ireland.
One could contend that, even if statutorily 
homeless households are socially disadvantaged 
relative to other new social tenants, this does 
not necessarily mean that they have experienced 
any greater ‘long-term housing need’ than other 
groups seeking social housing (Fitzpatrick and 
Stephens, 1999). However, the above evidence 
is at least suggestive of statutory homelessness 
being a reasonable proxy for sustained housing 
need. In any case, the particular distress caused 
by the crisis nature of homeless households’ loss 
of last settled accommodation, coupled with the 
insecurity and sense of ‘life on hold’ associated 
with living in temporary accommodation (Pleace et 
al., 2008), could plausibly be argued to justify the 
‘reasonable’ (not overriding) priority that they have 
to be given in allocations (Fitzpatrick, 2008).
A different (in fact opposite) concern about 
high proportions of lettings to very ‘needy’ 
homeless households is that these will exacerbate 
the residualisation and stigmatisation of the 
social rented sector, and may reinforce the 
‘neighbourhood effects’ which can exacerbate the 
social exclusion faced by poor tenants. However, 
this is a debate which goes beyond issues related 
to statutory homelessness and relates to the 
balance to be struck between meeting ‘housing 
need’ and promoting ‘mixed communities’ in social 
housing policy more generally (see Fitzpatrick and 
Stephens, 2008; Hills, 2007).
Preventing homelessness post-
devolution
A key policy innovation in the post-devolution 
period has been the growing emphasis on 
homelessness prevention. This prevention agenda 
has been pursued with most vigour in England, 
where it was prompted by a particularly sharp 
increase in the number of statutorily homeless 
households in temporary accommodation in 
the early 2000s (see Figure 22). In 200, the 
Government introduced an official target to 
halve the number of households in temporary 
accommodation in England by December 2010 
(Office of the Deputy Prime Minister (ODPM), 
200). This target has undoubtedly been a 
powerful device in promoting the official prevention 
agenda in England.
Critical to the English agenda on prevention 
is the ‘housing options’ approach. Under this 
preventative model, households approaching a 
local authority for assistance with housing are 
given a formal interview offering advice on all of 
their ‘housing options’. This may include being 
directed to services such as family mediation 
or rent deposit guarantee schemes that are 
designed to prevent the need to make a statutory 
homelessness application.
Table 3: Characteristics of new social housing tenants in England, by homelessness status 2007/08 
Statutorily homeless Other homeless Not homeless
Proportion of lets to 
black and minority ethnic 
households
14% 17%  13%
Proportion of lets to lone 
parents  
36%  18% 20%
Proportion of lets to people 
not in work
77% 68% 63%
Mean weekly household 
income 
£121.08 £133.6  £14.18
 
Source: CORE Lettings Log (includes both housing association and local authority new general needs lettings only).
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Wales has seen the official promotion 
of a prevention/housing options approach 
similar to that in England and, as in England, 
the implementation of this agenda has been 
associated with a sharp drop in levels of statutory 
homelessness acceptances. Concerns have been 
raised in both jurisdictions about the extent to 
which these trends represent ‘genuine’ reductions 
in the level of homelessness or arise, at least in 
part, from increased local authority ‘gatekeeping’ 
which may on occasion amount to a denial of 
applicants’ legal rights (Clapham et al., 2009; 
Pawson, 2009a).
In Scotland, too, prevention has moved up 
the agenda, but interventions have been relatively 
limited and largely experimental (Pawson et 
al., 2007). New Scottish guidance has been 
published on homelessness prevention,11 but the 
approach has remained cautious. This caution 
appears linked to anxieties on the part of the 
Scottish Government not to be seen to ‘dictate’ 
to local authorities in the context of the national 
Concordat (Anderson, 2009), as well as to 
avoid allegations of gatekeeping of the type that 
have emerged in England and Wales. However, 
such gatekeeping is in fact is much less likely in 
Scotland than elsewhere in the UK because of its 
rolling programme of regulatory inspections of local 
authorities’ housing and homelessness functions 
(Pawson and Davidson, 2008). In Northern 
Ireland, homelessness prevention appears to be 
only now moving onto the agenda. This lesser 
attention to prevention may explain why statutory 
homelessness has declined later, and less, in these 
two parts of the UK than in Wales and England.
In order to be effective, preventative policies 
have to target the key causes of homelessness. 
As Table 4 shows, the main ‘trigger’ for statutory 
homelessness across the UK is relationship 
breakdown of various kinds: with parents, with 
other relatives or friends, or with a partner (both 
violent and non-violent). Hence the emphasis 
within homelessness prevention programmes, 
within England at least, on ‘family mediation’ 
(especially for younger people leaving the family 
home) and ‘sanctuary schemes’ (which provide 
security measures and support to enable those at 
risk of domestic violence to remain in their homes).
The ending of a fixed-term tenancy is the only 
other category of a substantial size in England (it 
is not possible in the rest of the UK to separately 
identify ending of fixed-term tenancies from other 
loss of tenancies).
Loss of social or private sector tenancies 
because of rent arrears is a much less important 
cause of statutory homelessness across Great 
Britain (no breakdown in reasons for loss of 
tenancy is available for Northern Ireland). This 
is probably in part because households with 
rent arrears are likely to be found ‘intentionally 
homeless’.
Eviction rates in social housing have in fact 
shown a decline in England for some years now. 
By 2007/08, these stood at around 0.4 per cent 
of local authority tenancies (Pawson, 2009b13) and 
0.6 per cent14 of housing association tenancies. 
Table 4: Reasons for homelessness (2007/08)12 
England Scotland Wales Northern 
Ireland




Other relatives or friends no longer willing or able to accommodate 13%  8%
Violent relationship breakdown with partner  12% 16% 7% 13%
Other relationship breakdown with partner  6% £133.6  £14.18
Mortgage arrears 4% 1% 4% 1%
Rent arrears 2% % 1%
17% End of (fixed-term) tenancy 1%
9% 24%
Loss of other rented or tied housing %
Other reasons 19% 31% 21% 41%
Total 100% 100% 100%  100% 
Base 63,180 6,609 6,367 19,030
 
Source: CLG, Scottish Government, WAG, NIHE44 Addressing homelessness
In Wales, the figures were higher at 1.6 per cent 
of local authority tenancies, and 1.0 per cent of 
housing association tenancies.1
The Scottish local authority eviction rate is also 
somewhat higher than that in England, standing 
at 0.67 per cent in 2007/08;16 though the housing 
association eviction rate (at 0.7 per cent)17 is very 
similar to that of England. Both the local authority 
and housing association eviction rates have risen 
over the past few years in Scotland (Pawson, 
2009c).
In all parts of the UK, evictions from the 
social rented sector are overwhelmingly due to 
rent arrears. Thus, the declining eviction rate 
in English local authorities has paralleled falling 
arrears levels, associated with improved arrears 
management and the pre-eviction protocol for 
rent arrears actions introduced in 2006, as well as 
the now very strong emphasis on homelessness 
prevention.
No data is available on eviction rates in the 
private rented sector, and direct comparisons 
between the social and private rented sector on 
this measure would in any case be conceptually 
problematic because of the preponderance of 
fixed-term tenancies in the latter. However, some 
indication of the de facto level of insecurity in the 
private rented sector is given by the recent survey 
of private landlords in Scotland which suggests 
that the ending of around one in eight private 
tenancies is attributable to landlord action (Crook 
et al., 2009).
Particular concerns are focused at the moment 
on repossession rates among home owners, 
which have risen sharply since the beginning of 
the credit crunch. In 2004 first charge mortgage 
possessions across the UK were at a 20-year 
low of around 8,200 homes, but since then the 
number of first charge possessions has been 
rising, reaching 40,000 in 2008, and is estimated 
to reach 6,000 homes in 2009 (this estimate 
was recently revised downwards by the Council of 
Mortgage Lenders (CML) from 7,000) (Council of 
Mortgage Lenders, 2009).
These figures are not disaggregated by CML 
into the constituent countries of the UK, but 
analysis of mortgage possessions in Scotland 
cautiously indicated that the rate of possessions 
may be higher than elsewhere in the UK (Bramley 
et al., 2009). The same study suggested that 
up to a third of all repossessed home owners in 
Scotland are accepted as statutorily homeless.
A further indication of differences in the 
proportions of mortgagers with some difficulty 
in each country is provided by analysing the 
numbers receiving state ‘Support with Mortgage 
Interest’ (SMI) (see Figure 24). Over the decade 
to 2006 numbers declined in all countries, with 
the exception of Scotland, partly as a result of 
a benign period of economic growth, and partly 
as a result of the increasing impact of the rules 
preventing households with post-199 mortgages 
and becoming unemployed from receiving SMI for 
a nine-month period (this period has now been 
shortened as part of the package of measures 
to support vulnerable home owners during the 
recession).
That the numbers remained constant in 
Scotland may reflect the more recent rapid growth 
in owner occupation in Scotland. More generally, 
the data shows a far higher proportion of home 
owners in receipt of SMI in Northern Ireland 
than elsewhere, and the proportion in England 
somewhere below that in Scotland and Wales.
The devolved administrations have responded 
differently to risk in the homeownership sector. The 
Scottish Mortgage to Rent scheme was launched 
in 2003 and, by converting their owner-occupied 
home to a social housing tenancy, had prevented 
624 households from losing their housing by the 
beginning of 2008 (averting an estimated 8 per 
cent of possessions each year). The scheme has 
subsequently been expanded to include the option 
of a shared equity exit from full homeownership. 
Similar mortgage rescue schemes are only 
becoming operational during 2009 in England and 
Wales; these new schemes are small scale and 
targeted on those households most vulnerable to 
homelessness.
A ‘pre-action protocol’ for mortgage arrears 
claims was introduced in the courts in England and 
Wales in 2008, and will be adopted in Northern 
Ireland from late 2009. The protocol is designed 
to ensure that the courts only grant lenders’ 
possession actions as a ‘last resort’. There are 
currently no plans to introduce the pre-action 
protocol in Scotland, though given that lenders’ 
mortgage collection processes are UK-wide, any 4 Addressing homelessness
benefits associated with the pre-action protocol 
are likely to be experienced by Scottish borrowers 
in arrears too.
On a slightly different tack, Scotland has 
brought into force legislation that requires 
creditors, as well as private landlords and housing 
associations, to alert the relevant local authority 
that they are intending to evict or repossess, with a 
view to enabling the local authority to try to prevent 
homelessness wherever possible.
Finally, some mortgage lenders have agreed to 
join a UK-wide scheme, the Homeowner Mortgage 
Support Scheme, whereby the government 
provides guarantees to help lenders support 
defaulting borrowers by allowing them to defer 
a portion of payments due for up to two years. 
The scheme is complex, and the extent to which 
it will help borrowers in arrears over and above 
those already being assisted by lenders’ individual 
forbearance policies remains uncertain. The lender 
forbearance that we have seen thus far seems to 
owe more to market conditions and the desire to 
avoid losses arising from negative equity than to 
these government measures, though they will have 
undoubtedly contributed to the climate in which 
lenders felt compelled to act (Ford and Wallace, 
2009). It is uncertain whether the current extent of 
forbearance will persist once the market changes.
Before leaving this topic, it is worth bearing 
in mind that during the last housing recession, 
the proportion of statutory homelessness 
acceptances prompted by mortgage arrears never 
rose above 12 per cent in England (in 1991), 
and was lower elsewhere in the UK. In 2007/08, 
mortgage arrears accounted for 1–4 per cent of 
all reasons for acceptance as homeless in the 
UK countries (see Table 4; it is also worth noting 
that the latest quarterly statistics for England, for 
the first quarter of 2009, indicate that only 3 per 
cent of homelessness acceptances were related 
to mortgage arrears). So it is unlikely that even 
the very large recent hike in repossessions will 
have a major impact on overall levels of statutory 
homelessness.
In fact, it is conceivable that the recession 
may lead to a drop in statutory homelessness 
acceptances (as it did in the early 1990s 
recession). There are already signs that statutory 
homelessness is being eased by an expansion 
in the availability of accommodation in the 
private rented sector, as some owners who are 
struggling to sell their properties rent them out 
instead. Moreover, if the current ‘mortgage famine’ 
ends and falling house prices lead to improved 
Figure 24: Proportion of owner occupiers receiving support with mortgage interests
Source: Calculated from Table 17 and 112 UK Housing Review 2007/8 (Wilcox, 2008)46 Addressing homelessness
affordability in the owner occupied sector, this 
may have second-order effects which boost the 
number of social lets available for those in housing 
need.
That said, the fact that the mortgage market 
that emerges from the current turmoil is likely to 
be characterised by more prudent lending (‘super-
prime’), in contrast to the market that emerged 
after the 1990s recession which included the 
‘sub-prime’, may mean that these impacts on 
homelessness play out differently from last time 
round. Much also depends on how differently the 
post-2007 recession might affect homelessness 
under the new ‘prevention-focused’ regime, 
particularly in England.
Providing housing support to 
homeless people and those at risk 
of homelessness
This Supporting People (SP) national (UK) 
funding stream, introduced in 2003, provides 
‘housing-related’ support for a range of vulnerable 
groups, with homeless people and those at 
risk of homelessness key amongst them. The 
numbers assisted are significant: in 2007/08, for 
example, the SP programmes in England and 
Scotland supported, in combination, over 100,000 
homeless individuals or families.
Typically, these SP-funded services provide 
help with claiming benefits, budgeting, furnishing 
accommodation, accessing health and other 
services, and finding ‘purposeful activity’. They 
are often provided on a ‘floating’ basis to people 
living in mainstream accommodation, but are very 
diverse with respect to the intensity and duration 
of support they offer. The providers of most SP 
services are voluntary sector agencies, though 
there is some direct local authority provision, 
especially in Scotland.
The pattern of provision of housing support 
services tends to follow a similar pattern across 
the UK. Services working with the broadly 
defined ‘socially excluded’ group, which includes 
homeless people and those at heightened risk 
of homelessness (such as people involved in 
substance misuse, former offenders and people 
with mental health problems), accounts for 18–20 
per cent of service places in most areas. However, 
these services are overwhelmingly provided for 
short periods; consequently their turnover is high 
and they account for a disproportionate amount 
of SP ‘traffic’. In England in 2007/08, for example, 
over 80 per cent of the individuals reported as 
receiving housing support were within this ‘socially 
excluded’ group.
This may now change quite radically with the 
removal of ring-fencing of SP funding in both 
England and Scotland, which means that local 
authorities now have much greater discretion on 
how to spend the relevant funds (arrangements 
are different in Wales and Northern Ireland where 
SP funds are administered directly by the WAG 
and the NIHE, respectively, rather than by local 
authorities). Work in England suggests that some 
higher cost housing support services, including 
specialist provision for homeless people with 
politically ‘unpopular’ support needs such as 
substance misuse, may be vulnerable now that 
ring-fencing has been removed (Pleace, 2008). In 
Scotland, it has been suggested that ‘low level’ 
forms of housing support may be hardest hit, 
such as those designed to prevent homelessness 
(Scottish Council for Single Homeless, 2009).
There are concerns about overall SP funding 
levels in all parts of the UK: SP funding has been 
under continuous review and has experienced 
sustained reductions since its introduction in 2003. 
This is likely to worsen with the anticipated public 
sector spending squeeze from 2011 onwards, 
and to some extent the key question is whether 
spending cuts for services targeting different 
groups are proportionate.
Conclusions
The analysis contained in this chapter suggests 
that the ideal homelessness system would 
combine the vigour of the English and Welsh 
preventative measures (alongside appropriate 
inspection and other safeguards against unlawful 
gatekeeping) with the strong statutory safety net 
available in Scotland (alongside robust assessment 
methods to counter concerns about any ‘perverse 
incentives’ that this may create).
Of course, the shortage of social rented 
housing makes the Scottish ‘universal assistance’ 
approach difficult to deliver in many parts of 47 Addressing homelessness
the UK, most notably in London – in fact, it is 
arguable whether even the current homelessness 
entitlements are deliverable in the capital 
(Fitzpatrick, 2008). Even in Scotland, pressure on 
social housing stock means that there are serious 
challenges in delivering this model in practice. That 
said, the political momentum seems sufficient to 
ensure that, whatever the difficulties, the 2012 
undertaking to abolish priority need will be met. 
There is, however, less certainty that the remaining 
HTF recommendations – including on intentionality 
and local connection – will be fully implemented.
In Scotland and Northern Ireland, it seems that 
prevention measures do need to be implemented 
more strenuously if ‘statutory demand’ is to be 
reduced. There is much that could be gained 
from examining English and Welsh approaches 
in this regard, and the Scottish concerns about 
gatekeeping should be assuaged by its robust 
inspection regime (though this inspection regime 
is under review and may change significantly in 
2010). The Concordat may preclude Scottish 
Government from pushing through a much 
stronger prevention agenda in the aggressive and 
highly effective manner seen in England, but as 
in England, many Scottish local authorities may 
welcome a robust preventative approach in order 
to manage pressure on their social housing stock, 
without having to be forced down this route.
In all parts of the UK with shortages of social 
housing, it makes sense to make greater use 
of the private rented sector (with appropriate 
conditions with regards to accommodation quality 
and length of tenancy) to discharge homelessness 
duties, particularly to single and younger 
households. The current Scottish position (under 
review), whereby fixed-term tenancies cannot be 
used to discharge duty, even with the household’s 
consent, does not seem tenable, especially in the 
context of the widening of priority need.
That said, it cannot be assumed that 
the private rented sector is a panacea to 
homelessness pressures; it is not an endlessly 
elastic resource that can stretch to accommodate 
all groups that cannot be absorbed into social 
housing, and where it is used for statutorily 
homeless groups there are likely to be 
displacement effects that may impact on other 
groups in housing need. It is also clearly a less 
secure form of accommodation than social 
housing and its use for vulnerable families with 
children in particular must be approached with 
great caution.48 Improving housing quality
5  Improving housing quality
This chapter explores the impact the devolved 
governments have made in improving the services 
provided to social sector tenants by their landlords, 
and in improving the quality of the housing stock 
for low-income households in all tenures.
Both these improvements have taken pace in 
the context of a major restructuring of the social 
rented sector, with extensive programmes of stock 
transfers by local authorities in England, Scotland 
and Wales. The chapter therefore begins with 
a discussion of the nature and extent of these 
changes, and the changes that the devolved 
administrations have made to the regulatory 
frameworks for social sector housing.
Ownership of social housing
Historically, social rented housing followed the 
‘council house’ model across the whole of Great 
Britain, in which almost all social rented housing 
was owned and managed by local authorities 
that were in effect local monopolists. In Northern 
Ireland local authority housing was transferred 
to the NIHE in 1971 to counter discrimination in 
allocations.
The policy to extend the role of housing 
associations began in 1988, again across 
Great Britain. The decision to promote housing 
associations as the main provider of new social 
rented housing was taken in part because the 
government preferred to separate the strategic 
and ownership functions of local authorities, but 
also because, under the current definitions of 
the UK fiscal rules, housing associations could 
attract private finance without it scoring as public 
expenditure (as would be the case for local 
authorities).
As seen in Chapter 3 across the four 
jurisdictions, the absolute size of the social rented 
sector has fallen since 1998, with the stock losses 
as a result of RTB sales (and some demolitions) 
exceeding the gains through new construction.
Local authorities also began to take advantage 
of the access to private finance available to 
housing associations by transferring their stock 
into housing association ownership.
As a consequence of stock transfers, the 
provision of virtually all new social rented stock in 
the housing association sector, and the greater 
impact of the right to buy on the council sector, 
there has been a marked shift in the size of the 
council and housing association sectors over the 
last two decades, as seen in Figure 2.
If this overall trend effectively predates 
devolution, large scale transfers by individual 
councils of their total housing stock to newly 
created housing associations were almost 
entirely confined to England in the pre-devolution 
period. Initiated by individual councils, the policy 
was rapidly adopted and promoted by central 
government.
Initially, the English transfers focused on 
rural and suburban councils with low levels 
of outstanding debt, and with clear financial 
incentives to take the transfer route. Rental 
income, required pre-transfer to be applied 
towards the costs of housing benefit, could 
instead be applied to service private sector 
borrowing to finance substantial programmes of 
major repairs and improvements. Moreover, there 
were typically significant net capital receipts for 
the council, applied in part (in some cases) to fund 
new affordable housing, but that more generally 
were beneficial for councils ‘general funds’.
By April 1999 there had already been over 70 
large-scale council stock transfers in England, 
involving some 330,000 dwellings. The new 
landlords raised some £2. billion private finance 
– in addition to the funds required to acquire the 
stock from the councils. Councils received some 
£2 billion in receipts net of the residual debt on 
the transferred stock, of which almost £700 was 
available for investment (Wilcox, 2008a).
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was mostly associated with the disposal of 
Scottish Homes (formerly Scottish Special Housing 
Association) stock, together with some selective 
transfers of individual council estates, typically 
requiring very significant levels of investment, 
to small community-based associations. There 
was, however, one whole council stock transfer 
in Scotland in the pre-devolution period, by 
Berwickshire Council, a small coastal/rural 
authority (Taylor, 2004). In contrast, there were no 
such transfers at all in Wales in the pre-devolution 
period.
Post-devolution, large-scale transfer was 
favoured and promoted by the (then) Scottish 
Executive, and with more circumspection (at first) 
by the WAG. This approach was underpinned 
by the agreement by HM Treasury that it would 
absorb the costs of any outstanding debt on the 
council stock transferred, leaving the devolved 
administrations with the need only to meet from its 
own budgets the costs of any ‘dowry’ that might 
be required to ensure that the new stock landlord 
had sufficient funds to undertake the required level 
of investment.
Dowries apart, the transfers left the budgets 
of the devolved administrations intact – and 
available to meet other priorities. At the local level 
the financial case for transfer primarily rested on 
the access to funds for stock investment through 
the transfer route that would not realistically be 
made available if the stock remained in council 
ownership.
In this context, between 2003 and 2007, six 
local authorities in Scotland, of which by far the 
largest was Glasgow, transferred their stock (of 
some 117,000 dwellings) to housing associations, 
while five local authorities in Wales transferred their 
stock (of some 32,00 dwellings). Subsequently 
in 2009 two further Welsh authorities have 
undertaken stock transfers (of some 13,00 
dwellings), and two more Welsh authorities have 
now obtained positive stock transfer ballots; this 
relates to stock of some 8,600 dwellings.
In Scotland the 2003 Glasgow stock transfer 
was of particular, and unique, significance, and not 
just because of its scale. Involving some 80,000 
dwellings (almost one sixth of the total local 
authority stock in Scotland at the time), the transfer 
required HM Treasury to finance the £909 million 
outstanding council debt on the stock, and the 
Scottish Executive to provide £787 million in grant, 
against which the Glasgow Housing Association 
(GHA) raised £72 million in private finance, 
towards an envisaged £2.2 billion investment 
programme over the decade to 2014.
The GHA transfer was also unique in that it was 
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planned as a two-stage process; with the initial 
transfer to a single landlord as a stepping stone 
to further onward transfers to small community-
based associations. This would, in effect, follow 
the earlier Scottish model of stock transfers, and fit 
with the strategy of creating a more ‘contestable’ 
social sector housing market (Maclennan and 
O’Sullivan, 2008).
Two of the Welsh transfers also followed 
a distinctive route, by adopting a Community 
Housing Mutual model in which the housing is 
owned by co-operative of which all tenants are 
members. One of the more recent Welsh transfers 
has also followed a very similar route, though on 
a ‘bridge’ model by which the housing will first be 
transferred to a conventional housing association.
More recently the emphasis on stock 
transfers in Scotland has receded. In part this 
is a response to the negative tenant ballot that 
halted the proposed stock transfer by Edinburgh 
City Council, and the GHA’s slow and uncertain 
progress with respect to the envisaged series 
of onward transfers to small community-based 
associations in Glasgow.
However, it also reflects the introduction 
of the prudential borrowing regime for council 
housing in Scotland that has significantly eased 
the financial pressures for stock transfer both on 
local authorities and the Scottish Government. As 
outlined in Chapter 1, this contrasts with the much 
more limited role for prudential borrowing by local 
authorities in England and Wales.
In England there was also a trend towards 
larger urban stock transfers in the last decade, 
but in addition the government provided for an 
alternative model to stock transfers in order to 
attract funding to upgrade social housing stock. 
Local authorities that achieve high management 
ratings in inspections can establish Arms Length 
Management Organisations (ALMOs) under 
which the local authority retains ownership of the 
housing, but the housing is managed by a board, 
one third of whose members are tenants.
The first ALMO was established in 2002, and 
now around half of the remaining council stock 
is under the management of some 69 ALMOs. 
As a result of the qualifying criteria and selection 
process, the management standards of ALMOs 
compare favourably with both mainstream local 
authorities and housing associations (Pawson, 
2009b).
This model was intended as a response to 
political pressures to provide local authorities 
with an alternative to stock transfer, but it has 
now been constrained by its own success. The 
additional public borrowing permitted for stock 
improvements by ALMOs has had to be provided 
from within the overall budget available to CLG; 
leaving less and less available for other non-
transferring authorities.
Neither the Scottish nor Welsh governments 
have favoured the ALMO model, as it does not 
provide them with any additional resources, while 
the HM Treasury support for stock transfers makes 
that option far more financially attractive, and 
particularly so in the case of Wales.
While the ALMO option was adopted by 
a substantial number of English authorities, 
nonetheless the stock transfer process continued 
apace, and between 1998 and 2007 a further 
728,90 dwellings were transferred. However, 
these included a number of smaller-scale transfers 
of selected estates, as well as total stock transfers, 
and in a minority of cases the transfers had to be 
supported by dowries (involving some 11 per cent 
of the stock transferred over the period).
Following these transfers, and the continuing 
impact of RTB sales and new housing association 
development, by the end of 2007 almost a half of 
the total social sector stock in England was owned 
by housing associations (in their various forms), 
and over two fifths of the social sector stock in 
Scotland was owned by housing associations. 
While Wales lagged somewhat behind with just 
30 per cent of its social sector stock in housing 
association ownership by 2007, the subsequent 
transfers and ballots will see that shortly rise to 
over 40 per cent.
In contrast there has been no significant stock 
transfers in Northern Ireland, where the public 
sector stock is concentrated in the hands of 
NIHE. While there are similar financial pressures 
on budgets in Northern Ireland, the lengthy 
suspension of the devolved government, and the 
unique position of NIHE, has to date stood in the 
way of any serious consideration to alternative 
ownership or governance arrangements for the 
NIHE stock.1 Improving housing quality
Stock transfer is often a contentious issue 
and it has encountered some notable setbacks, 
including ‘no’ votes in ballots in Edinburgh and 
Birmingham. More generally the rejection rate had 
been rising, although it is notable that positive 
stock transfer ballots have been recently achieved 
in Wales, notwithstanding the concerns about 
private finance raised by the credit crunch. In all 
four countries further changes must be anticipated 
in the coming decades.
While there are debates about the respective 
merits of councils and housing associations in 
terms of both governance, and the quality of 
service provision, one of the undoubted impacts 
of stock transfer has been on the additional 
resources it has made available for investment in 
stock repair and improvement. This is considered 
further below in the section on housing quality.
Regulation of landlords providing 
affordable housing
The regulation of landlords has been in flux in 
all jurisdictions. The newly devolved Scottish 
administration inherited Scottish Homes, a 
‘quango’ on the Housing Corporation model with 
responsibility for registering, regulating and funding 
housing associations. Scottish Homes was initially 
replaced by Communities Scotland, an executive 
agency with an urban regeneration as well as 
housing remit, until it too was abolished in 2008. 
However, the Scottish Government felt the need 
to retain an arms-length regulator, and in 2008 the 
regulation and inspection division of Communities 
Scotland became the Scottish Housing Regulator 
(another executive agency).
In contrast in Wales, Tai Cymru was abolished 
(in 1998) and its functions transferred into the 
WAG. However, there have been concerns 
about the limited effectiveness of these in-house 
regulatory arrangements, and proposals for a 
radical restructure, and the establishment of a 
regulatory board along Scottish lines, were among 
the key recommendations of the ‘Essex’ review 
(Affordable Housing Task and Finish Group, 2008).
A parallel process has occurred in England, 
with the Housing Corporation being split in two; 
its registration and regulatory functions now lie 
with the Tenant Services Authority (TSA) which 
has its own board. While regulation in Scotland 
and England has been separated from funding, 
the breadth of the regulatory authorities’ functions 
is widening. The Scottish Housing Regulator also 
inspects the housing and homelessness services 
of local authorities, and the TSA’s remit is due to 
be extended across all social landlords in 2010.
The role of the Housing and Communities 
Agency (HCA) (the other body set up after the 
demise of the Housing Corporation) includes the 
land assembly and regeneration role of the former 
English Partnerships. Its role is to be extended to 
include the registration of private landlords from 
the end of 2009, paralleling the introduction of 
their mandatory licensing in Scotland in 2006. In 
Scotland this is undertaken by local authorities, 
and this follows the practice in England, Wales 
and Scotland concerning Houses in Multiple 
Occupancy (HMOs). In Northern Ireland mandatory 
licensing applies to HMOs in five designated areas 
particularly close to universities.
While these represent changes in the 
institutional landscape in each country, they are 
several steps back from the more immediate 
concerns of this report about the impact of 
housing devolution on low-income households. 
They are concerned with issues around housing 
strategy, and the cost effectiveness of new 
investment, as well as the regulation of social 
landlords. If it is too early to judge the outcome of 
these changes in the institutional landscape, other 
than to note the inevitable short-term dislocation 
involved in such institutional reforms, the more 
direct issues around the standards of social sector 




New housing quality standards have been 
introduced in each of the four jurisdictions: the 
Decent Homes Standard in England and Northern 
Ireland, the Scottish Housing Quality Standard, 
and the Welsh Housing Quality Standard. While 
the standards differ in detail, they commonly 
concern serious disrepair, modern facilities and 
insulation standards. The Welsh standard includes 
provisions relating to the neighbourhood as well 
as the individual dwelling, while the Scottish 
standard has more exacting energy efficiency 2 Improving housing quality
requirements. More recently the decent homes 
standard adopted in England has become more 
exacting, as the requirement for a property to meet 
minimum ‘fitness’ standards has been replaced by 
a requirement to meet more wide-ranging health 
and safety standards.
In England the target, adopted in 2000, was 
to make all social homes ‘decent’ by 2010, with 
most of this improvement occurring in deprived 
areas (Department of the Environment, Transport 
and the Regions (DETR), 2000). In 2002 a further 
target to increase the proportion of ‘vulnerable’ 
households living in private sector decent homes 
to 70 per cent by 2010 (and 7 per cent by 2020) 
was adopted. The cross-tenure Scottish Housing 
Quality Standard (SHQS) was adopted in 2004, 
with a target for all social housing to reach this 
standard by 201. The Welsh standard is also 
focused only on social housing and the target for 
compliance is 2012. The Decent Homes standard 
in Northern Ireland was adopted in 2004, with a 
target for all social housing to meet it by 2010.
While the standards and targets may differ 
between the four countries, in each case they 
have focused their newly developed higher quality 
targets primarily on improving the social sector 
stock, with much weaker targets and/or standards 
set in respect of private sector stock. However, 
as noted in Chapter 2, almost a half of the low-
income population in Scotland live in private sector 
housing, and rather more than a half across the 
rest of the UK.
Investment in stock improvements
The achievement of these quality objectives has 
been linked to the future ownership models for 
social housing. In England councils were required 
to assess whether they could achieve the 2010 
decent homes standard for their stock through the 
options of stock transfer, ALMOs, or the use of 
Private Finance Initiatives (PFIs), with conventional 
stock retention only being viewed by central 
government as an option if the target could be 
achieved on the basis of planned levels of public 
sector funding.
This approach was also followed by the 
Scottish and Welsh councils; but without the 
option of ALMOs. However, as noted above, in 
Scotland the ‘prudential’ borrowing regime has 
also provided councils with the potential access to 
capital funding to improve stock that has not been 
transferred. NIHE attempts to upgrade stock are 
inhibited by both the absence of stock transfers 
and borrowing constraints.
Comprehensive aggregate data on investment 
on major repairs and improvements to the social 
sector stock are not readily available. There is very 
limited aggregate data on housing association 
investment in improving their existing stock (rather 
than on new build), and similarly in respect of stock 
transfers, where much of the initial private finance 
raised at the point of transfer is required to cover 
deficits in the early years of their operation, as well 
as for investment programmes.
There is aggregate data on local authority 
investment on their retained stock, albeit that 
in some cases this includes a small amount 
of expenditure on new build. That investment 
increased over the devolution decade, although as 
a result of stock transfers and right to buy sales it 
related to an ever-reducing stock.
Figure 26 shows the increase in investment 
for each country as an annual expenditure per 
dwelling. At the commencement of the decade 
expenditure per dwelling was highest in Scotland, 
and lowest in Wales. By the end of the decade it 
was highest in England, and marginally lower in 
Northern Ireland than in Wales, with investment in 
Scotland at an intermediate level.
The increase in funding to improve the council 
stock within England was a conscious policy 
priority in the early years of the new Labour 
Government; it was only from 2003/04 that there 
was any significant increase in the budget for new 
social sector housing. These increased provisions 
for council borrowing were, in turn, reflected in 
the Barnett formula computations of the overall 
budgets for Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland.
However, post-devolution neither the Scottish 
nor Welsh governments made any provision for 
increased borrowing for investment in council 
stock improvements. In Wales the council housing 
capital budget was effectively frozen in cash terms 
at pre-devolution levels. Similarly there was very 
little change in the provision for council house 
borrowing in Scotland, before the advent of the 
prudential borrowing regime.
In effect the Scottish and Welsh governments 
had other priorities within their devolved budgets, 
and clearly viewed stock transfer as a preferred 3 Improving housing quality
source of funding for stock improvements that 
would make fewer demands on those budgets.
Scottish councils were, however, permitted to 
make full use of their receipts from council house 
sales, and without the constraints of a redistributive 
revenue regime were also able to fund investments 
directly from their revenue streams.
In Northern Ireland investment levels in NIHE 
estate renovation did not increase post-devolution 
until 2002/03, following a sharp rise in the funding 
available from sales receipts in the preceding 
years.
There was little change in the levels of 
provision for private sector improvement grants 
post-devolution in England, Scotland or Northern 
Ireland. In real terms budgets fell. In Wales the 
budget was reduced sharply post-devolution; 
albeit from a much higher level in the pre-
devolution years.
Figure 27 shows the expenditure on private 
sector improvement grants in the four countries in 
1998 and 2007 as an amount per private sector 
dwelling (excluding grants for the installation of 
disabled facilities). While it would have been better 
to show this expenditure in terms of poor quality 
private sector dwellings, this is precluded by 
the use of different quality standards in the four 
countries.
It is notable that expenditure per dwelling on 
improvement grants is much lower in England; 
although the differences between the countries 
reduced over the devolution decade. Even so, by 
2007 the average grant per private sector dwelling 
in England was at only half the level of Scotland 
and Wales; and only a quarter of the level in 
Northern Ireland.
In 1998 the average grant per dwelling was 
highest in Wales; but by 2007 the Welsh grant 
expenditure per private sector dwelling was only 
a little higher. As a result of the much smaller 
reduction in funding, again from a relatively high 
pre-devolution level, by 2007 grant expenditure per 
private sector dwelling was far higher in Northern 
Ireland; at almost double the prevailing levels in 
Scotland and Wales.
Thus if both policy targets and investment 
provisions clearly prioritised improvements to the 
social sector stock relative to provision for private 
sector improvements in all four countries over 
the last decade, it was in England where that 
difference in priorities was most pronounced.
Impacts on measured housing quality
Measuring the outcome of these policies and 
investment levels in each country is complicated 
not just by the different stock condition standards 
Figure 26: Investment in council housing
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in each country, but also because of the 
differences in the timing of the stock condition 
surveys undertaken separately by each country. 
Within these constraints the development of 
housing quality measures and changes in stock 
condition are outlined in turn below for each 
country.
There has been a very significant fall in the 
proportion of social rented houses that do not 
meet the Decent Homes standard in England. In 
2001, there were 1.64 million non-decent homes 
in the English social rented sector, and by 2006 
this had been reduced to 1.13 million. Taking 
into account the fall in the total stock of social 
housing over the period, these figures imply a 
fall in the proportion of non-decent homes in the 
English social rented sector from 39 to 29 per cent 
(Communities and Local Government, 2008).
The proportion of vulnerable households living 
in non-decent private sector homes fell from 43 
per cent in 2001 to 32 per cent in 2006. While the 
definition of ‘vulnerable’ households in this context 
is related to low incomes, in that it includes all 
households in receipt of means tested benefits, 
it does not include the substantial numbers of 
low-income pensioners in the private sector that 
are entitled to, but do not claim, pension credit or 
council tax benefit (Cuthbertson et al., 2009).
Within the private sector overall, the proportion 
of dwellings failing to meet the decent homes 
standard fell from 1 to 41 per cent in the private 
rented sector, and from 29 to 24 per cent in the 
owner occupied sector. All these measures are 
based on the decent homes definition requiring 
housing to be fit, rather than the new standard that 
requires them to meet specified health and safety 
standards.
On the new definition of decent homes, 29 per 
cent of the social sector dwellings were still non-
decent in 2006 and 2007, while the proportion of 
‘vulnerable’ households in the private sector fell 
from 41 to 39 per cent (Communities and Local 
Government, 2009).
The proportion of all dwellings failing the 
Northern Ireland Decent Homes standard fell from 
32 per cent in 2001 to 23 per cent in 2006 (Fry 
et al., 2007). The failure rate for NIHE dwellings 
halved from 0 to 2 per cent, while the failure rate 
for the housing association stock increased a little 
from 7 to 9 per cent.
There was also a sharp decline in the failure 
rate for dwellings in the private rented sector in 
Northern Ireland, from 47 to 27 per cent, while the 
failure rate for owner occupied dwellings fell from 
23 to 20 per cent. In all cases these comparable 
measures show far fewer non-decent homes in 
Figure 27: Improvement grants in 1998 and 2007 per private sector dwelling
Source: UK Housing Review tables) Improving housing quality
Northern Ireland than in England, and a more 
pronounced rate of progress over the devolution 
decade.
The Scottish and Welsh Quality Standards are 
not comparable to the English and Northern Irish 
Decent Homes standards, and these are reflected 
in the much higher proportion of dwellings that 
fall below the adopted standards. In Scotland the 
primary reason for the far higher failure rate is the 
more exacting energy efficiency standards.
In 2002 only 23 per cent of Scottish social 
sector housing met the SHQS, and this rose 
only slowly to about 29 per cent in 2007. Over 
the same period the proportion of private sector 
dwellings meeting the SHQS rose from 23 to 33 
per cent.
The proportions among housing association 
housing rose from 34 to 38 per cent, which 
represents a higher standard than both the owner-
occupied sector (27 and 3 per cent) and the 
private rented sector (18 and 20 per cent) (Cairns 
et al., 2009).
Of course these figures do not fully capture 
the extent of improvements in the quality of 
the stock; housing that has been improved on 
many indicators can nonetheless still fail to meet 
the standard, and landlords often approach 
improvement on an element by element basis.
Moreover, these survey-based figures differ 
from those based on returns from social landlords, 
which show that half of housing association 
properties meet the standard. The monitoring 
report suggests that  per cent of the total stock of 
social housing was brought up the SHQS in 2007.
Within the private sector in 2007 there was also 
a higher level of ‘extensive disrepair’ in the private 
rented sector (37 per cent), than in the owner-
occupied sector (27 per cent). This compares with 
31 per cent in the local authority sector and 28 per 
cent in the housing association sector.
Very high rates of failure to meet the Welsh 
Housing Quality Standard (WHQS) are recorded 
by the Living in Wales survey, which found that 
in 2004, 86. per cent of social homes failed to 
meet the standard (with almost all of the balance 
being accounted for by dwellings that were not 
surveyed) (Statistics for Wales, 2008a). It should 
be noted that to meet the standard, a dwelling had 
to pass all 19 ‘primary’ elements and 18 (out of 23) 
‘secondary’ elements.
More than 90 per cent of the social sector 
stock met most of the ‘primary element’ 
requirements, with high failure rates only for a 
limited number of elements, such as the thermal 
performance of external walls, the security offered 
by doors and windows, the requirement for a 
shower as well as a bath, the effectiveness of 
the heating system, and the requirement for a 
minimum of 200 mm of loft insulation.
As the WHQS has only been set as a standard 
for the social rented sector, the analysis did not 
cover private sector stock. Data on the WHQS 
is also only available for 2004; so there is not yet 
any measure of progress towards achieving that 
standard over time. One measure of progress 
in stock condition standards in Wales over time 
is offered by the declining incidence of ‘unfit’ 
dwellings, from 8. per cent of the stock in 1998, 
to 4.8 per cent in 2004 (Statistics for Wales, 
2008b).
Housing quality and low-income households
As seen above, only in Scotland do over a half 
of all the low-income households reside in the 
social rented sector, and the English data on 
vulnerable households in the private rented sector 
does not fully capture the numbers of low-income 
households, as they exclude those not claiming 
means tested benefits. The national surveys do, 
however, contain data on the relationship between 
low incomes and housing quality in all tenures in 
each country. As with the more general data there 
are, however, constraints around the compatibility 
of data between the four countries and over time.
Between 1996 and 2006, the proportion of 
unfit dwellings in the English housing stock fell 
from 6 per cent to just 3 per cent; with the higher 
proportion occupied by low-income households 
falling from 11 to 6 per cent over the same period. 
Of these almost three quarters were in the private 
sector (in 2006), with slightly more numerically 
in the owner-occupied sector. Proportionately, 
however, just over one in eight low-income 
households in the private rented sector were living 
in unfit dwellings.
Higher proportions of low-income households 
also lived in dwellings that failed the decent homes 
standard in all tenures, including the social rented 
sector. Just over 3 in 10 low-income households 
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decent homes in 2004/05 (mid point of 3-year 
averages), while more than a third of all low-
income home owners and nearly a half of all low-
income tenants in the private rented sector were 
also living in non-decent homes (see Figure 28).
It is also notable that while the proportion of 
low-income households in non-decent homes 
in the private rented sector is very similar to the 
proportions of ‘vulnerable’ households (50 per cent 
in 2004 and 48 per cent in 2005), the proportion 
of low-income households in non-decent homes in 
the owner-occupied sector is considerably higher 
than the proportion of vulnerable households (30 
per cent in both 2004 and 2005) (Communities 
and Local Government, 2007). This confirms one 
of the weaknesses of the definition of vulnerable 
households, in that it does not include low-
income households that are eligible for, but do not 
claim, means-tested benefits. This is particularly 
pertinent in the owner-occupied sector, with high 
proportions of eligible households failing to claim 
either council tax benefit or pensioner credit.
Data for Wales in 2004 also shows a higher 
proportion of low-income households living in 
unfit dwellings. While overall just 4.8 per cent 
of households were living in unfit dwellings, the 
unfitness rate for low-income households was thus 
9.3 per cent. (In this case low-income households 
are those in the lowest income bands used by the 
survey, which comprise some 23 per cent of all 
households.)
It may also be noted that the low-income 
households living in unfit dwellings in Wales were 
also predominantly in the private sector, with 
some three fifths being owner occupiers, just 
over a quarter private renters and some 1 in 7 
residing in the social rented sector (Figure 29). In 
proportional terms, however, the incidence of low-
income households living in non-decent homes 
was highest within the private rented sector, where 
almost 1 in 5 low-income households were living 
in an unfit dwelling, compared to 10 per cent of all 
low-income home owners, and just 2 per cent of 
low-income tenants in the social rented sector.
The incidence of low-income households living 
in dwellings that fail to meet the decent homes 
standard in Northern Ireland is shown in Figure 30. 
In this case low incomes are the lowest income 
bands, with incomes up to £9,999 a year; which 
comprise some 30 per cent of all households. 
This again confirms that low-income households 
are more likely to live in non-decent homes than 
households with higher incomes, even (albeit to a 
lesser degree) within the social rented sector.
Figure 28: Non-decent homes in England by tenure and income quintile
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Figure 30 also shows that for low-income 
households, as well as for all households, the 
incidence of non-decent homes in Northern 
Ireland is lower than the data shown for England 
in Figure 28. However, some caution is required 
in comparing the two figures due to the different 
definitions of low incomes available from the two 
countries’ house condition surveys.
While the proportionate incidence of low-
income households living in non-decent homes 
is highest within the private rented sector, as a 
consequence of its small size these households 
only represent one fifth of all low-income 
households living in non-decent homes in Northern 
Ireland; compared to 28 per cent in the social 
rented sector and 2 per cent in the owner-
occupied sector.
A further indicator of the association between 
low incomes and poor house conditions in 
Northern Ireland is provided by an analysis of the 
presence, or rather the absence, of double glazing. 
Nearly a half of all low-income private tenants 
do not have the benefit of full double glazing, 
compared to two fifths of low-income home 
owners and a third of all social sector tenants. 
Again taking account of the different sizes of the 
tenures, a half of all households without the benefit 
of full double glazing are owner occupiers, while a 
fifth are private tenants and 28 per cent are social 
sector tenants.
One notable feature, however, is that very 
few social sector tenants live in dwellings with 
partial double glazing compared to those in the 
owner-occupied and private rented sectors. In 
consequence the proportion of households with 
no double glazing is also highest within the social 
rented sector; they account for just over two fifths 
of all low-income households without the benefit 
of any double glazing, with just less than two fifths 
owner occupiers, and a fifth in the private rented 
sector.
A similar pattern can be seen in Scotland, with 
low-income households in all tenures more likely 
to live in dwellings that fail the SHQS. Figure 31 
compares the position of households with incomes 
below £200 per week, that comprise 2 per cent 
of all households, with those with incomes of 
£200–00 per week (47 per cent of all households) 
and those with incomes over £00 per week (28 
per cent of all households). The average failure 
rate for the years 2004/07 on which the analysis is 
based was 72 per cent for all households.
The failure rate is highest in the private 
rented sector, with even private tenants in the 
high-income band being more likely to occupy 
a dwelling that fails the SHQS than low-income 
Figure 29: Unfitness and low-income households in Wales, 2004
Based on approximate lowest quintile (23 per cent) from banded incomes8 Improving housing quality
Figure 30: Non-decent homes in Northern Ireland by tenure and low income
Source: 2006 Northern Ireland House Condition Survey
Figure 31: Dwellings failing the SHQS by tenure and income band
Source: Analysis of 2004/07 SHCS combined datasets9 Improving housing quality
tenants in the social rented sector. The failure rate 
in the owner-occupied sector is also higher than 
in the social rented sector, with only owners in 
the high-income band being less likely to occupy 
a dwelling that fails the SHQS than low-income 
tenants in the social rented sector.
While the figure shows the highest income 
social sector tenants being more likely to occupy 
dwellings that fail the SHQS than tenants on low 
and moderate incomes, it should be borne in mind 
that this is a very small group, comprising just  
per cent of all social tenants. Social tenants with 
incomes below £200 per week are still slightly 
more likely to occupy a dwelling that fails the 
SHQS than social tenants with incomes above that 
level (72 per cent compared to 69. per cent).
As a consequence of the different size of 
the tenures, two thirds of all the low-income 
households living in dwellings that fail the SHQS 
are owner-occupiers, while 8 per cent are private 
tenants and 26 per cent are social sector tenants.
The improvements in stock condition over 
the devolution decade, especially in respect of 
social sector housing, is at one level a measure of 
the success of the policies the four governments 
have pursued in that regard, and the resources 
they have made available to that end. While there 
are differences between the four countries in the 
funding provided, and in the impact on improving 
the social sector stock, they have all given a higher 
priority to improving the social sector stock than to 
dealing with poor conditions in the private housing 
stock, which is occupied by the majority of low-
income households.
The more nearly the policy objectives for 
improvements in the social sector stock are 
achieved, the more the question arises as to the 
continuing appropriateness of current policies and 
priorities, given the increasing concentration in the 
private sector of low-income households in the 
poorest condition housing.
Housing quality and energy efficiency
One of the few direct comparisons on the stock 
condition of the devolved countries that can be 
made is in respect of energy efficiency ratings. 
‘SAP’ ratings (out of a maximum of 100) are 
available for England, Northern Ireland, Scotland 
and Wales, although the Welsh data is only 
available for 2004.
These results put the different national quality 
measures into perspective. While very high 
proportions of social sector dwellings in Scotland 
and Wales fail the nationally adopted quality 
standards, compared to the proportion of social 
sector dwellings failing the decent homes standard 
in Northern Ireland and England, the SAP ratings 
provide a different picture.
On that energy efficiency measure, dwellings 
in the social sector in Scotland have the highest 
rating, followed by social sector dwellings in 
Northern Ireland, while the average rating for 
Wales is only marginally below that for England. 
The average rating for private sector dwellings 
is lower than that for social sector dwellings in 
each country, but nonetheless the average rating 
for private sector dwellings in Scotland is still 
higher than the rating for social sector dwellings in 
England and Wales (see Figure 32).
The relative SAP ratings for each country are 
not, however, solely a reflection of policies and 
investment to improve stock condition and energy 
efficiency in each country. In part they also reflect 
the association between higher SAP ratings 
and flatted dwellings, as opposed to houses. In 
Northern Ireland, for example, the average SAP 
rating for a flat was 63 in 2006, compared to just 
49 for a detached house (Fry et al., 2007).
Post-devolution all four countries have made 
considerable efforts to improve the energy 
efficiency of social sector dwellings, through both 
broader improvement programmes and more 
specific energy efficiency programmes. In contrast 
there have been limited, and predominantly means 
tested, programmes aimed at improving energy 
efficiency in private sector dwellings.
These means tested programmes are also 
hampered by the low take-up of pensioner credit 
and council tax benefit, as those benefits are used 
as qualifying criteria for the means tested energy 
efficiency grants available in each country (Burrows 
and Wilcox, 2000). With mounting concerns about 
the need to reduce carbon dioxide emissions 
in the future, all four countries will need to give 
greater attention to the issues involved in delivering 
improvements to the energy efficiency ratings of 
the existing private sector stock (Wilcox, 2008a).60 Improving housing quality
Social housing management 
performance
The policies adopted by the devolved governments 
to finance, restructure and regulate social sector 
landlords all have the potential to impact on the 
quality of their housing management services. 
Indeed all four governments have arrangements 
in place to monitor the performance standards of 
social sector landlords against key indicators, such 
as rent arrears, void rates, re-let times, and the 
timely completion of repairs.
The measures used, and the data available, do 
not however make possible a comprehensive and 
fully comparable measure of performance over the 
last decade for all four countries. The focus here is 
on the data available for two measures that directly 
reflect the quality of the service to tenants: repairs, 
and the time taken to let vacant dwellings.
Data on the average time taken to re-let vacant 
dwellings is available for both local authorities and 
housing associations in England, Scotland and 
Wales; the most recent figures are shown in  
Table .
Table : Average number of days taken to let 
vacant dwellings in 2007/08
Country Local authority Housing 
association
England 31 40
Scotland  1 22
Wales N/A 31
Source: Pawson (2009b), Housing Corporation (2008), The 
Scottish Housing Regulator (2009), Welsh Data Unit (2009)
Some caution is needed in comparing these 
figures from different data sources. Average re-let 
times also reflect the varying levels of demand for 
dwellings of different types in different localities. 
For Scottish local authorities figures are also 
available distinguishing between the average re-let 
times for ‘low-demand’ and ‘not-low-demand’ 
stock. Figures for 2006/07 showed an average 
re-let time for low-demand dwellings of 80 days, 
compared to just 44 days for not-low-demand 
dwellings.
Figure 32: Energy efficiency ratings, 2006
Data for Wales is for 2004. For all other countries it is for 200661 Improving housing quality
However, even the ‘not-low-demand’ re-let 
times for Scottish local authorities are far higher 
than the average for local authorities in England, 
and housing associations in Scotland and Wales. 
They are also a little higher than the average 
figures for housing associations in England. 
Nonetheless the available time series data does 
show local authority performance on this indicator 
improving in both England and Scotland in the 
years since 2000/01. Performance by housing 
associations in Wales has, however, deteriorated 
since 2001/01 when the average re-let time was 
just 2 days. However, it should be noted that the 
2007/08 figure reflects the very lengthy average 
re-let period (123 days) for one large stock transfer 
landlord.
Similar caution is needed in respect of figures 
on the extent to which landlords deal with repairs 
within targeted timescales. In part this is because 
the target times for dealing with emergency, urgent 
and non-urgent repairs vary from landlord to 
landlord, and also because different categories of 
repairs are measured in the different datasets.
Overall, a very high proportion of repairs are 
dealt with within the (self-defined) target times, but 
with local authorities in Scotland and Wales lagging 
rather behind English local authorities, NIHE and 
housing associations in Scotland and Wales  
(Table 6). 
Table 6: Percentage of response repairs completed 
within target times in 2007/08*





Northern Ireland 98% N/A
Source: Pawson (2009b), Scottish Housing Regulator 
(2009), Statistics for Wales (2009), Northern Ireland  
Housing Executive (2008)
Again the available time series data shows 
that performance by local authorities in England, 
Scotland and Wales all improved since the 
beginning of the decade. It is difficult to attribute 
these performances to any specific changes in the 
post-devolution regulatory or related arrangements 
in any country. While there is a suggestion that 
the option for high performing ALMOs in England 
to secure additional investment resources might 
have acted as a particular incentive to improve 
performance, the evidence shows that over 
the five years to 2007/08 they improved their 
performance only a little more than other councils 
(Pawson, 2009).
More generally arrangements for monitoring 
housing management performance are well 
embedded in all four countries, and this would 
appear to be more significant than the specific 
differences in the way these arrangements are 
managed, and have been developed post-
devolution in each of the four countries.
Conclusions
The proportion of social housing owned by 
housing associations rose in all four countries over 
the decade; both as a result of housing association 
new build and stock transfers. Nearly a half of the 
social housing stock in England, just over two fifths 
in Scotland, and some 30 per cent in Wales was 
owned by associations by 2007. The proportion 
was just a fifth in Northern Ireland, reflecting the 
unique position of NIHE.
Stock transfers accessed additional funds 
for stock improvements, as well as changing the 
structure of the social sector housing market. 
Twenty-four per cent of the English council stock 
was transferred in the decade; 19 per cent in 
Scotland and 14 per cent in Wales. In Scotland 
the Glasgow transfer was of particular significance, 
although its failure, to date, to complete the 
anticipated second round transfers to small 
community-based associations means it has not 
yet led to the market restructuring that was one of 
its objectives.
Neither Scotland, Wales or Northern Ireland 
have followed England in adopted the ALMO 
model for council housing; primarily as it did not 
offer the financial advantages of stock transfer. 
While Scotland more forcefully promoted stock 
transfers following devolution, that stance has 
since softened, partly as a result of the Edinburgh 
no vote and the delays with the second stage 
transfers in Glasgow, and partly in response to the 
advent of the prudential borrowing regime which 
has increased the financial freedoms of councils 
in Scotland to a much greater degree than in 
England and Wales.62 Improving housing quality
While Wales did not initially promote stock 
transfers as strongly as Scotland, it has maintained 
the pressures through limiting the budgets for 
council housing, and from a slow start there is now 
a momentum behind a wave of transfers. Three of 
the Welsh transfers have also followed a distinctive 
route by adopting a Community Housing Mutual 
model, or similar, rather than a conventional 
housing association.
The regulatory frameworks for local authorities 
for housing associations have been radically recast 
in England, Scotland and Wales (where further 
reforms are planned). However, these changes are 
relatively recent and it is too early to judge their 
impact.
All four countries introduced new housing 
quality standards over the decade. While 
Northern Ireland adopted the ‘decent homes’ 
standard along with England, Scotland and Wales 
introduced their own quality standards, and in both 
cases these are (in different ways) rather higher 
than the decent homes standard. While England 
set targets for both social and private sector 
housing related to the decent homes standard, 
in Scotland and Wales their respective quality 
standards have only been used to set targets for 
social sector housing.
The different quality measures, and the timing 
of house condition surveys, make it difficult 
to make any robust measure of comparative 
improvements over the decade.
Investment in improving the council sector 
housing stock increased most rapidly in England 
over the decade and (measured per dwelling) 
was far higher at the end of the decade than 
the equivalent spend in Northern Ireland and 
Wales, with Scotland in an intermediate position. 
Substantial levels of additional funding for stock 
improvements were also raised through stock 
transfers.
Investment in improving private sector housing 
was a much lower priority in all four countries. 
Grants expenditure (per private sector dwelling) 
was by far the lowest in England; with expenditure 
in Scotland and Wales at double the English level, 
and with four times the level of expenditure in 
Northern Ireland.
The proportion of dwellings failing the decent 
homes standard fell in both England and (more 
rapidly) in Northern Ireland; as did the proportion 
of dwellings failing the Scottish Housing Quality 
standard. Time series data on the Welsh Housing 
Quality standard is not yet available. Despite the 
limited government support, stock condition in the 
private sector improved more rapidly than in the 
social sector in both England and Scotland over 
the decade.
Only in Scotland do the majority of low-income 
households live in social rented dwellings. In all 
four countries low-income households are more 
likely to live in dwellings falling below the national 
quality standard; this applies to both private and 
social sector housing. Moreover overall private 
housing is more likely to fail these standards than 
social sector housing, and consequently the 
majority of low-income households living in below 
standard accommodation are located in private 
housing.
In that context, and with the improvements 
in social sector standards achieved over the last 
decade, the question arises as to the continuing 
appropriateness of the policies and priorities that 
focus far more on improving the social sector than 
private sector dwellings.
In all four countries average energy efficiency 
ratings for social sector dwellings are higher than 
for private sector dwellings. Scotland has the 
highest ratings; and the average rating for private 
dwellings in Scotland is higher than for social 
sector dwellings in England and Wales.
Policies to improve the energy efficiency of 
dwellings have also prioritised support to improve 
social sector dwellings in all four countries, with 
predominantly limited and means tested help 
available to assist with improvements in the private 
sector. The effectiveness of these schemes is also 
constrained by the links with pension credit and 
council tax benefit, which both have low take-up 
rates by low-income households living in private 
housing. With mounting concerns about carbon 
dioxide emissions in the future, all four countries 
will need to consider measures that effectively 
deliver energy efficiency improvements in the 
private sector.
Housing management standards for social 
sector housing have improved in all four countries 
over the last decade, although they still lag 
somewhat among Scottish and Welsh local 63 Improving housing quality
authorities. It is difficult, however, to link the 
improvements to the specific arrangements to 
monitor standards and regulate social landlords 
in each country, although in England there is a 
suggestion that the financial rewards available 
to high performing councils with ALMOs did 
result in greater improvements in management 
performance than those made by other councils.64 Some final observations
Some final observations
One of the critical measures of the success of the 
1999 devolution settlement is the satisfaction each 
country derives from the greater control it gives 
them over public policies, and the ability to develop 
them to reflect their own context and culture. That 
satisfaction was palpable in all our discussions 
with members of the ‘policy communities’ in each 
country.
But not all devolutions are equal. Scotland has 
had a full decade with fully devolved legislative 
powers, while Wales has had to operate (more or 
less) within the constraints of secondary legislation 
and a less generous budget settlement, and 
Northern Ireland’s devolution has so far been a 
very on–off affair.
In ten years all four countries have made a 
significant start in charting out their own distinctive 
policy courses; but it is still relatively early days to 
measure the outcomes of their housing policies 
for low-income households. The influences of 
government policies on housing markets and 
neighbourhoods are mostly gradual, and it is far 
easier to chart aspirations than outcomes.
Indeed some of the most significant differences 
in housing policy outcomes have their roots in pre-
devolution differences. Council housing finances 
in Scotland are much freer because it was never 
subject to the redistributive regime introduced in 
England and Wales in 1989; and post-devolution 
that advantage has been magnified with the 
advent of prudential borrowing. Conversely, 
Scotland’s ability to rein in the excesses of the RTB 
was hampered by the absence of inherited powers 
to put a cap on maximum discounts for existing 
tenants.
But devolution does not, in itself, mean that 
devolved policies will deliver better housing for low-
income households. The devolved administrations 
have made different choices about the priority 
afforded to housing within their devolved budgets. 
Within a more constrained budget, Wales also 
gave a lower priority to housing than the other 
three countries of the UK.
With its full decade with wider powers, 
Scotland has been able to make more of a 
difference in developing a distinctive policy 
agenda, infused with a wider vision for the public 
realm. Its distinctive policies on extending the 
rights of homeless households, and in introducing 
the ‘modernised’ RTB for new tenants, are two 
key examples.
If Wales has achieved rather less, this should 
be seen in the context of the greater budget 
constraints, and the limitations of their powers. In 
simple terms of equity, there is case for widening 
the primary legislative powers of the Welsh 
Assembly, replacing the limited and convoluted 
arrangements of the Wales Act 2006, and 
reviewing their devolution financial settlement.
It is far too early to assess the position in 
Northern Ireland given the long interruption in the 
operation of the devolution settlement. Critical to 
its future outcomes will be decisions about the 
future of the NIHE.
But underlying the differences in approach, 
there are also some common themes with 
respect to the ways in which policies in the post-
devolution period have impacted on the housing 
circumstances and opportunities of low-income 
households. The availability of social sector lettings 
has declined in all four countries, as investment 
in new housing has lagged behind stock losses 
through RTB sales.
While Scotland and Wales have adopted 
distinctive (and higher) housing quality standards 
than those in England and Northern Ireland, the 
quality of the social sector stock has improved 
over the decade, as a result of both new stock 
additions, and investment in the existing stock 
funded both by the governments, and, in England, 
Scotland and Wales, by stock transfers.6 Some final observations
However less attention, and less funding, has 
been provided for improvements to poor condition 
dwellings in the private sector, and in all four 
countries the majority of low-income households 
living in poor condition dwellings now reside in the 
private sector. Particularly in the light of growing 
concerns about energy efficiency issues, all four 
countries will need to focus more on delivering 
improvements for those households.
While we have examined a wide range 
of housing policy issues and their impact for 
this study, there are inevitably areas where 
specific issues would benefit from more detailed 
examination. We have been fortunate to be 
able to draw on detailed comparative study on 
many aspects of homelessness policy in the four 
countries; but this has also served to highlight the 
contrast with the absence of equivalent detailed 
comparative evidence on housing stock condition 
and housing management performance. We can 
only offer the comparisons in this report as a 
first step towards the fuller studies these topics 
deserve.
Devolution will evolve and mature, and the 
impact of distinctive policies will emerge more fully 
over time. It will also face new challenges in the 
post-credit crunch era, in particular in responding 
to the growing concerns around environmental 
issues, and the housing, social and health 
requirements of an aging population. But perhaps 
the most significant measure of the success of 
devolution is that it can only go forward; no one 
now wants to go back.66 Notes
Notes
1  Now called the Housing Delivery and 
Homelessness Directorate.
2  The NIHE is the responsible body with respect 
to the Province.
3  Certain ‘persons from abroad’, including 
asylum seekers, are ineligible. 
4  That said, the proportion of applicant 
households which were accepted as owed the 
main duty was not actually that much higher 
in Scotland in 2007/08 (at 7 per cent of all 
applicants, and 80 per cent of those assessed 
as homeless) than in the other UK countries 
(48–49 per cent of all applicants, and 67–70 
per cent of those assessed as homeless).
  Comparable data on the ‘stock’ of households 
in temporary accommodation is not available 
for Northern Ireland, but the annual number of 
placements in temporary accommodation has 
recently declined (source: NIHE).
6  This includes both ‘assured’ private sector 
tenancies with security of tenure and ‘assured 
shorthold’ fixed-term private sector tenancies. 
7  That said, there is increasing use of the private 
rented sector as a preventative mechanism, 
especially in England (see below).
8  A measure of the percentage of tenancies 
sustained for more than 12 months is being 
added to the Audit Scotland dataset as from 
2008/09.
9  Unpublished analysis by Scottish Government. 
10 It will noted that the patterns identified here are 
broadly in keeping with the differential rates of 
homelessness applications and acceptances 
noted in Table 2 – with England and Wales 






12 All four countries record reasons for 
homelessness in different ways, and therefore 
we have had to adopt some very broad 
categories in this table to aid some sort of 
comparison. The ‘other’ reasons include, for 
example, leaving institutional accommodation, 
racial harassment, and external violence, all of 
which are recorded in some countries but not 
in others, as well as a large ‘other’ category 
in all instances. It must also be borne in mind 
that the Scotland and Northern Ireland figures 
are for all applicants, whereas the figures for 
England and Wales are only for those owed the 
main duty.
13 Note that this figure does not include anti-
social behaviour evictions (which would 
probably add up to 10 per cent to the total). 
14 Source: Regulated Survey Returns Tenant 
Services Authority.
1 Source: Social Landlords’ Possessions and 
Evictions 2007/8, Statistics for Wales October 
2008.
16 Source: Housing Statistics for Scotland 
Bulletin, November 2008.
17 Source: Shelter (2008) Evictions by Social 
Landlords in Scotland. Available from www.
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